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Human Equity?
Regulating the New Income
Share Agreements
Shu-Yi Oei*
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A controversialnew financingphenomenon has recently emerged. New
"income share agreements" ("ISAs") enable an individual to raise funds by
pledging a percentage of her future earnings to investors for a certain number
of years. These contracts, which have been offered by entities such as Fantex,
Upstart, Pave, and Lumni, raise important questions for the legal system: Are
they a form of modern-day indenturedservitude or an innovative breakthrough
in human financing?How should they be treated under the law?
This Article comprehensively addresses the public policy and legal
issues raised by ISAs and articulatesan analyticalapproach to evaluatingand
regulatingthese agreements. While there has been a nascent movement in favor
of enacting overarchingregulatory schemes to govern these new arrangements,
this Article suggests that we should resist that trend because a unified approach
is likely to create more problems than it solves. Instead, we suggest the adoption
of a case-by-case approach that examines each ISA's distinctive economics and
draws analogies to more familiar financialarrangementsin designing its legal
treatment. Such case-by-case regulationis likely to generate rules that are more
equitable and efficient. We offer a multifactorframework for implementing this
"regulationby analogy."
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I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2013, Fantex, Inc. launched a platform that allows
the public to buy and sell shares that track the brand performance of a
professional football player.' The athlete agrees to pay Fantex a

1.
See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B1) (Apr. 25, 2014), available at
https://fantexbrands.comifiles/Final%2OFantex%2OVernon%2ODavis%20Prospectus-vOl_flo896
.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XP8V-R8KF (describing Fantex's issuance of stock tracking the
Vernon Davis brand).

684

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:681

percentage of his future earnings attributable to NFL and related
activities in exchange for a lump-sum payment up front. Shareholders
earn dividends based on payments received by Fantex from the athlete.
Although the Fantex stock offering is actually of shares in Fantex, Inc.,
the popular press has not hesitated to characterize the offering as an
opportunity to buy shares or to invest in a football player. 2
The Fantex transaction is not unique. Rather, it is just one
example of a new type of financing arrangement that has recently
emerged: income share agreements ("ISAs"). These agreements, which
have arisen in contexts as diverse as professional sports, education, and
startup financing, possess a critical feature in common: an individual
seeking immediate financing obtains funds by pledging a percentage of
her future income to investors for a certain number of years. ISAs
represent a notable departure from traditional forms of individual
lending (e.g., student loans or venture debt) because they effectively
grant the funding provider the upside if earnings are higher than
expected and the downside risk if they are lower. As such, they raise a
number of important challenges for the legal system, including
questions of whether they should be permitted and, if so, how they
should be regulated. In this Article, we take up the important
normative and legal questions raised by these new arrangements and
propose a framework for designing their regulation. 3 This Article
constitutes the first serious attempt in the legal literature to
comprehensively address the legal and regulatory issues raised by ISAs
and to articulate a generalized analytical approach to their regulation. 4
ISAs have developed against the backdrop of Internet platforms
that reach millions, a continued credit crunch in borrowing, and several
decades of creative financial contracts. Over the past two years, 5 a

2.
See, e.g., Patrick Clarke, Fantex Holdings Will Allow Fans to Buy, Sell Stock in Arian
Foster, Pro Athletes, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 17, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1814830-fantex-holdings-will-allow-fans-to-buy-sell-stock-in-arian-foster-pro-athletes,
archived
at http://perma.cc/XQU3-X9LV (suggesting, in its headline, that the stock is an investment in
Arian Foster himself).
3.
This Article develops more fully the concepts introduced in our prior essay. See Shu-Yi
Oei & Diane M. Ring, The New "HumanEquity" Transactions,5 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 266 (2014).
4.
The few other scholarly treatments have focused on more discrete issues, such as the
treatment of ISAs under securities and tax law. See Oei & Ring, supra note 3; Jeff Schwartz, The
Corporatization of Personhood, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2466720.
5.
See, e.g., Kate Rogers, Is the Private Sector Going to Fix the Student Debt Problem?,
FOXBuSINESS (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/04/25/isprivate-sector-going-to-fix-student-debt-problem/, archived at http://perma.ccNG67-WNAN.
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growing number of for-profit companies,' nonprofits, 7 and government
entities 8 have begun offering variations of these arrangements.
Although ISAs have precursors in older arrangements, such as Bowie
Bonds9 or Milton Friedman's human capital contracts,' 0 the current
social and financial environment, paired with the availability of
Internet technology, magnifies their potential impact and proliferation.
Even as their availability increases, however, ISAs pose serious
yet unanswered questions for the legal system: Should they be freely
permitted? Do they cross the line into ownership or equity-like interests
in humans-a de facto "incorporation" of humans?" Do these
arrangements involve excessive relinquishments of personal freedom
and autonomy? Do they raise Thirteenth Amendment problems? If
some or all of these transactions should be encouraged or at least
permitted, how should they be regulated under securities, bankruptcy,
contract, tax, and consumer protection law? Which agencies or legal
actors should be responsible for their regulation? Because the new
generation of ISAs has only recently emerged, the legal literature has
barely begun to grapple with these questions.12

6.
See, e.g., PAVE, http://www.pave.com, archived at https://perma.ce/5YQK-B7HE (last
visited Jan. 13, 2015).
7.
See, e.g., About Lumni, LUMNI, INC., http://www.lumni.net/about/, archived at
http://perma.cclG7XM-6KV3 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (offering both nonprofit and for-profit fund
models); 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http://13thavenuefunding.org, archived at http://perma.cc/
4QBY-MKC3, (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
8.
See H.B. 3472, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (directing consideration of a pilot
"Pay Forward, Pay Back" program whereby students could opt to pay a proportion of their future
income in lieu of present payment of tuition and fees); see also Martha C. White, Oregon's 'PayIt
Forward' Program: Imagine College with No Tuition, No Loans, No Debt (Jul. 17,
2013), TIME.coM, http://business.time.com/2013/07/17/oregons-pay-it-forward-program-imaginecollege-with-no-tuition-no-loans-no-debt, archived at http://perma.ce/5CKB-UVPF (describing
Oregon's income-based repayment plan specifically and various state income-based repayment
plans generally).
9.
See, e.g., Bowie's Latest Hit: Royalty-Tied Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/21/nyregion/bowie-s-latest-hit-royalty-tiedbonds.html, archived at http://perma.cclWY3V-Z53N (describing bonds paying interest from the
royalties on certain David Bowie songs).
10. MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, Income in the Professions and in Other Pursuits,
in INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 90 n.20 (1945):

An individual will rarely sell a fixed proportion of his future income to an investor (i.e.,
he will rarely sell "stock" in himself), though he may borrow money .... On the other
hand, if individuals sold "stock" in themselves, i.e., obligated themselves to pay a fixed
proportion of future earnings, investors could "diversify" their holdings and balance
capital appreciations against capital losses . . . . Such investments would be similar to
others involving a large element of risk, a type of investment usually financed by stocks
rather than bonds.
11. For a science-fiction examination of a world in which humans are incorporated at birth,
see DANI KOLLIN & EYTAN KOLLIN, THE UNINCORPORATED MAN (2009).

12.

For initial explorations of ISAs, see Oei & Ring, supranote 3; Schwartz, supra note 4.
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The distinctiveness of ISAs paired with a desire for regulatory
certainty has led to a nascent movement in favor of enacting
overarching legal and regulatory schemes to govern them. For example,
in April 2014, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and former Representative
Tom Petri (R-WI) introduced a bill, the "Investing in Student Success
Act," seeking to clarify the legality of ISAs and their treatment under
securities, tax, bankruptcy, and usury laws.1 3 Other commentators
have also suggested a unified and consistent regulatory framework. 14
This Article cautions against such an approach. It argues that a
unified regulatory scheme may create as many problems as it solves.
Despite their shared features, ISAs are heterogeneous and can
resemble a variety of financial arrangements with which we are already
familiar. New variations could also develop. Given their diversity, their
resemblance to various preexisting categories, and the fact that we
already have regulatory structures for such preexisting categories, the
adoption of a new and unified regulatory scheme may cause
economically similar transactions to be treated differently and
ultimately may be over- or underinclusive or distortionary.
This Article argues instead that there are good reasons for
making normative judgments and regulatory decisions about ISAs on a
case-by-case basis by comparing and analogizing each new transaction
to a more familiar arrangement (such as debt, corporate equity,
servitude, insurance, or partnership interests) and by regulating it
similarly to its closest analogue.15 Each regulatory field should conduct
this type of analysis in designing the treatment of ISAs. The process of
comparison and analogy allows our experience with regulating similar
transactions to guide our normative review of the new ISAs. In cases
where a new transaction resembles, in substance, one for which there
exists a clear set of rules, invention of a separate regulatory approach
is likely to create unnecessary legal distinctions and distortions.1 6 By
13. H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (2014). Although it died with the close of the 113th Congress, the
Rubio-Petri Bill is an example of a unified approach and provides a benchmark for likely reform
proposals.
14.
See, e.g., MIGUEL PALACIOS, TONIO DESORRENTO & ANDREW P. KELLY, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK: FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION

THROUGH INCOME SHARE AGREEMENTS (2014) (urging clarification of the legal treatment of ISAs
in areas such as bankruptcy and tax); Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6:59) (arguing that
ISAs should be permitted and regulated under securities law and a complementary disclosure
regime).
15. This approach is not unprecedented and has been employed in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (using the
analogy to physical products liability to build a case for consumer protection with respect to credit
products).
16. See generally David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Efficiency, and Doctrine in the Tax Law,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1631 (1999) (arguing in favor of drawing the most efficient-as opposed
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contrast, "regulation by analogy"-identifying an existing transaction
with which an ISA has the most similarities and regulating that ISA in
a comparable fashion-would better avoid such regulatory
discontinuities.
Regulation by analogy does have its risks. Some might argue
that this approach could have a chilling effect on the ISA market due to
outcome uncertainty in the treatment of any given transaction.
However, this critique conflates regulatory certainty with substantive
uniformity. While a comprehensive and uniform regime for ISAs might
provide greater certainty for the covered transactions,1 7 it would likely
create significant and unnecessary legal distinctions and distortions as
between ISAs and other economically similar transactions. On the flip
side, it is possible to provide some regulatory certainty while doing
regulation by analogy. This could be achieved, for example, by using
narrowly tailored prototype guidance released by the relevant
regulatory authorities, either in the form of regulations or rulings. Use
of such carefully crafted safe harbors is a practice already familiar in a
variety of regulatory fields. 1 8
This Article suggests that regulation by analogy is best
accomplished using a multifactor analysis to probe each transaction's
true economics. Our multifactor approach draws upon jurisprudence
developed in tax and bankruptcy law, where courts have examined a

to the most doctrinally significant-lines between transactions in the tax law context); Jeff Strnad,
Taxing New FinancialProducts: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (1994)
(suggesting two analogical methods for assigning tax treatment to new financial arrangements);
see also Bradley T. Borden, QuantitativeModel for Measuring Line-DrawingInequity, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 971 (2013) (modeling inequity caused by line drawing); Yehonatan Givati, Walking a Fine
Line: A Theory of Line Drawing in Tax Law, VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2555254 (examining how lines are drawn in tax law).
17.
See infra Part III.A (discussing the view that a single regime applied to a broad swath
of ISAs would provide regulatory certainty, across many fields, to covered participants and
proposing a case-by-case approach instead).
18.
For example, Regulation D, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
provides a safe harbor from the onerous registration requirements for the issuance of certain
securities. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-08 (2014). Another example, from the federal tax law, was the
provision of a safe harbor for certain leasing transactions. See MARGARET RILEY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., SAFE HARBOR LEASING, 1981 AND 1982 (1983), available at http://www.irs.gov/

pub/irs-soil81-82sahale.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2LB-SX32:
[T]he new [1981] provisions guaranteed that a transaction would be recognized as a
lease for Federal income tax purposes, regardless of existing IRS guidelines for
determining whether a transaction is a lease, or merely a financing arrangement not
subject to the same tax benefits, and also regardless of whether its nontax economic
substance would otherwise be recognized as a true lease.
State-level regulators also employ safe harbor provisions. For example, Massachusetts regulations
provide a safe harbor for manufacturers attempting to comply with state law handgun
childproofing design requirements by listing several alternatives, which are deemed to meet the
functional standard of the law. See 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 16.05 (LexisNexis 2014).
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number of relevant factors to distinguish lenders from firm owners in
determining their appropriate treatment. 19 However, we envision that
the application of the multifactor approach would differ depending on
the legal regime doing the analysis, both in terms of the specific factors
applied and the emphasis accorded to each factor. A multifactor
approach allows us to examine the true economics of existing and future
ISAs on a case-by-case basis, rather than arriving at universal
conclusions regarding all ISAs. Although a broader, more unified
regulatory framework for ISAs may become advisable down the road,
uncertainties surrounding ISAs and their development suggest that the
initial regulatory move should be one grounded in analogy.

Part II of this Article describes ISAs, discusses their historical
antecedents, and explains how they relate to parallel developments in
crowdfunding. Part III first explains why a case-by-case analysis that
analogizes the ISAs to existing transactions is the superior approach
for their evaluation and regulatory design. It then generally describes
the universe of existing transactions to which ISAs are most analogous,
focusing first on the analytical extremes of slavery or servitude, and
debt, and then exploring the intermediate analytical possibilities. Part
IV sets forth our multifactor framework for determining whether a
given ISA is most analogous to debt, human ownership, or something
else, and correspondingly how it should be regulated. Part V
demonstrates the operation of our multifactor framework by applying
it to Pave, a pioneer in ISA offerings. This Part then examines the
Rubio-Petri proposed legislation as an illustration of the risks of an
overarching regulatory approach.
The proposal for case-by-case analysis advocated herein is a
second best solution, in the sense that it accepts as given the backdrop
of existing regulations governing financial instruments, with all of their
inconsistencies and imperfections. However, our proposed approach is
ultimately sound; drafting a single, comprehensive regulatory regime
for ISAs while deferring to existing regulatory regimes for other types
of transactions would likely create unintended and inappropriate
disjunctures and inefficiencies between the treatment of ISAs and other
transactions. Our proposed approach avoids that pitfall.

19. See, e.g., Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 444 F.3d 771, 784 (6th Cir. 2006); Fin Hay Realty
Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968).
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II. THE TRANSACTIONS: CURRENT VARIANTS AND
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

The transactions discussed in this Article are not homogenous.
Rather, their structures and economics vary, and they have arisen
across a number of sectors. Part II.A provides an overview of the new
ISAs. 20 Part II.B briefly describes their evolution and development.
Part II.C discusses how ISAs relate to recent developments in
crowdfunding and its regulation.
A. The New Income Share Agreements
1. Fantex, Inc.
As noted, Fantex is a trading platform that allows the public to
acquire stock linked to the brand performance of professional football
players. 2 1 As of April 2015, Fantex has commenced or announced stock
offerings relating to the brand performance of Vernon Davis, a San
Francisco 49ers tight end; E.J. Manuel, a Buffalo Bills quarterback;
Mohamed Sanu, a Cincinnati Bengals wide receiver; Michael Brockers,
a St. Louis Rams defensive tackle; and Alshon Jeffery, a Chicago Bears
wide receiver. 22 It plans to undertake additional stock offerings in the
future.
Underlying each offering is a contract between Fantex and the
athlete, which provides that the athlete receives a lump-sum amount
up front in exchange for a percentage of his future NFL-related income,
including income earned from NFL contracts, endorsements, and
appearance fees. 23 For example, in a $4.2 million IPO, Vernon Davis
received $4 million from Fantex up front in exchange for a ten percent
stake in his future NFL earnings. 2 4 Although Fantex is actually offering
stock in Fantex, Inc., in a transaction technically distinct from the
contract between Fantex and the athlete, the popular press has loosely

20. In addition to the ISAs discussed herein, see ENZI, http://www.enzi.org, archived at
http://perma.cc/L989-XCLE (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (ISA structure for education funding);
CUMULUS FUNDING, http://www.cumulusfunding.com, archived at http://perma.cclCZC2-FEWD
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (an ISA variant providing funds for "virtually any purpose").
21. See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., supra note 1.
22.
Explore Stocks, FANTEX, https://fantex.comlexplore, archived at https://perma.cc/3G4DK9JU (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). The offering of Michael Brokers shares is pending while the others
are currently trading. Id.
23.
See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., supra note 1 at 1, 97-100.
24. Id. at 6.
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characterized the deal as an opportunity for stockholders to acquire
shares in a football player. 25
2. Upstart, Inc. 2 6

In the entrepreneurial context, Upstart introduced in April 2012
a transaction that allowed potential investors to invest in individuals
seeking funds for business or education costs. This model was available
until May 6, 2014, when it was discontinued in favor of more traditional
loan products, due in part to regulatory uncertainties. 2 7 However,
agreements entered into between Upstart and funding recipients prior
to May 6, 2014, presumably remain in effect.
In return for an upfront cash investment in the funding
recipient, investors earned a specified percentage of the funding
recipient's earnings for a set term, typically five years. 28 The underlying
documentation was an agreement between Upstart (as a middleman)
and the funding recipient, under which the recipient agreed to pay the
investor (indirectly) the agreed percentage of recipient's total annual
income as reported on her tax return (Line 22 of Form 1040)29 over the
specified term. Significantly, Line 22 includes not only wages and
business income but also interest, dividends, alimony, and lottery
25. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Steve Eder, Like That Athlete? Buy a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2013, at Al ("[N]ow, thanks to Wall Street, fans can buy a stake in their favorite player."); see
also Clarke, supra note 2 (suggesting in its headline that the stock is an investment in Arian Foster
himself as opposed to Fantex's arrangement with Foster).
26.
This description of Upstart's ISAs draws in part on our prior essay, Oei & Ring, supra
note 3, at 269-70.
27.
Dave Girouard, Sunsetting Income Share Agreements on Upstart, UPSTART BLOG,
http://blog.upstart.com/post/84980267394/sunsetting-income-share-agreements-on-upstart
(May
7, 2014), archivedat http://perma.cc/953B-SLTT. Upstart noted that "while many regulatory and
policy efforts are underway to facilitate the development of the market, these efforts will likely
take many years." Id.
28.
See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT § 5.a, available at https://www.upstart.com/
funding-terms, archived at https://perma.cclV4HA-J2UE (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). Previously,
a ten-year term was also available. See OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT § 5.a (on
file with authors); see also Alison Griswold, Upstart: Can Crowdfunding Your Education and
Career Really Work?, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
alisongriswold/2012/08/10/upstart-can-crowdfunding-your-education-and-career-really-work/2/,
archived at http://perma.cc/E45A-WRJ5 ("Upstart estimates that typical students will raise
around $30,000 in exchange for 2 to 6% of their 10-year income .... ").
29.
See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supranote 28, § 2.a.i. Upstart interposed a grantor
trust between the investors and the recipient. See Who is Upstart Network Trust?, (Apr. 29, 2014)
(on file with authors). Upstart entered into the funding agreement with the recipient and then
transferred that agreement to the Trust (where it became a Trust asset). See id. The Trust issued
securities to investors in exchange for funds that were used to pay the recipient. Id. The Trust
securities were secured by the funding agreements and investors only received payment to the
extent the recipient paid the Trust. Id.; see also How Are the Securities Treated for U.S. Federal
Income Tax Purposes?(Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with authors).
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winnings (that is, any income regardless of any connection to the
activity or venture for which funding was sought). 30
The risk to the investors was partially mitigated by the funding
agreement's deferral provision, which deferred the annual payments
and added a year to the contract term if the recipient's income for the
year fell below a preestablished threshold.3 1 A funding recipient could
obtain up to five such deferrals, after which she was obligated to pay
the income share for the remainder of the now-extended contract
term. 32 The "risk" of the recipient's extraordinary success was capped
by limiting the total income payment to three times the amount of
funding received. 33
As of this writing, Upstart has started offering fixed-rate loan
products. 34 Upstart continues to distinguish their loans from more
traditional loan products on the grounds that their model incorporates
factors such as educational institution attended, academic area of
study, academic performance, and employment history in determining
the applicable interest rate. 35
3. Pave 36

Along with Upstart, Pave is another startup that commenced
offering ISAs in 2012.37 Pave has never been as open as Upstart in
making its deal documents public, and the actual deal documents are
only available to investors and funding seekers upon creation of an

30.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB No. 1545-0074, FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME

TAx RETURN 1 11. 7-22.
31.

UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28,

§ 2.b.i.

32. Id. The 2013 Agreement also included a hardship exemption for years in which the
recipient's income dropped below $20,000, even if the contract had previously been deferred five
times for low earnings. No additional contract extension would be made in such circumstances.
OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28,

§ 2.b.ii.

33. UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.c. In the 2013 Agreement, which
offered the option of a ten-year contract, the cap was five times the funding amount in the case of
a ten-year agreement. OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.c.
34.
What is Upstart?, UPSTART, http://upstarthelp.upstart.com/questions/108556-what-isupstart, archived at http://perma.cc/7J2F-V5U8 (last visited, Jan. 15, 2015).
35. Id.; see also Am I Eligible to Apply for a Loan?, UPSTART, http://
upstarthelp.upstart.com/questions/108498-am-i-eligible-to-apply-for-a-loan, archived at http://
perma.cc/Z25M-GZYG (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
36. The Pave transaction is governed by an Income-Linked Payment Agreement ("IPA"),
which is not publicly available. Invest Where It Matters Most to You, PAVE, https://
www.pave.com/introduction/backer, archived at http://perma.cc/4MGG-SUDH (last visited Jan.
15, 2015). See sources cited infra notes 38-48 for information details regarding Pave's ISA.
37. See Hadley Malcom, Pave: Alternative to Costly College Loans, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2013,
http://college.usatoday.com/2013/03/05/pave-alternative-to-costly-college-loans/, archived at http://
perma.cc/7ZXY-ERMS (noting Pave's initial ISAs were offered in December 2012).
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account with Pave. 38 Furthermore, as the market for ISAs has
developed, Pave has made less and less information publicly available
on its website, so it is difficult to know the exact economics of the
instruments currently being offered. The following summary is based
on information that was available on Pave's website as of May 2014.39

Pave's strategy (as of May 2014)40 was to target millennials and
"high potential individuals" seeking funding for a variety of purposes,
including to pay off student loans, to finance education, or to pursue
entrepreneurial ventures. 41 Like Upstart, the Pave transaction allows
funding seekers ("Talent") to obtain funding by promising to pay
investors ("Backers") a fixed percentage (no more than ten percent) of
their annual Line 22 total income over a specified term, which may not
exceed ten years. 42 However, unlike Upstart, the Pave arrangement is
"peer-to-peer."4 3 The average amount raised is $20,000.44

If Talent's income falls below 150 percent of the poverty line,
repayment obligations are waived, and the payment term is not
extended. 45 If Talent is in school, repayment obligations also cease, but

38. See PAVE, supra note 6.
39. Much of the publicly available information has since been removed from the website, so
it is difficult to know the extent to which the economics of the Pave structure have changed since
then. However, as was the case with Upstart, agreements already entered into between Pave's
investors and funding seekers presumably remain in effect.
40.
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
41. See How Can the Funds I Raise Be Used?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hdenus/articles/200917846-How-can-the-funds-I-raise-be-used- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors);
Financial Assistance for Millenials, PAVE, http://www.pave.com/financial-assistance-millenials
(May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
42. How
Much
of
My
Income
Will
I
Share
with
Backers?,
PAVE,
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407638-How-much-of-my-income-will-l-share-withBackers- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). If Talent is filing a joint return, the spouse's income
is deducted from Line 22 income. What Counts as Income When CalculatingHow Much I Must
Share with My Backers?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407688--Vhatcounts-as-income-when-calculating-how-much-I-must-share-with-my-Backers- (May 19,2014) (on
file with authors).
43.
Tell Me More About Pave's Income-Linked Payment Agreement (IPA), PAVE,
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200990453-Tell-me-more-about-Pave-s-Income-linkedPayment-Agreement-IPA- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
44. How Much Funding Can I Raise?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/
200848547-How-much-funding-can-I-raise- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). Pave collects
certain fees. What Are Pave's Fees?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200597893What-are-Pave-s-fees- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
45. Is There Ever a Time During the ParticipationPeriod When I Wouldn't Need to Share
Income?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407668-Is-there-ever-a-time-duringthe-participation-period-when-I-wouldn-t-need-to-share-income(May 19, 2014) (on file with
authors). In this, Pave is different from Upstart, because Upstart's hardship exemption does
extend the payment term. UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.b.i.
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the repayment term is extended. 46 Talent can terminate the agreement
early by paying Backers five times the original funding amount, which
effectively caps the maximum repayment. 47 The payment terms are
determined for each individual based on Pave's proprietary funding
model, which is designed to provide investors with a seven percent rate
of return. 48 While Pave's transaction resembles Upstart's, there are
structural, economic, and "soft" differences between them, which may
require different approaches to regulation.4 9 In August 2014, Pave
announced that it would be piloting a new loan product.50 However, it
is unclear whether that new product is in addition to, or in replacement
of, the ISA that Pave had previously been offering. In any event, the
Pave ISA continues to be relevant as a market leading ISA into which
Talent and Backers have entered.
4. Education-Based Transactions
The income share concept has also permeated the higher
education context, driven in part by rising education costs and the
search for alternative financing solutions. As the following discussion
demonstrates, education-focused ISAs have been offered by for-profit,
nonprofit, and government entities.5 1
a. Lumni
Lumni manages funds that invest in "diversified pools of
students." 52 Funding providers invest in a fund, which may be either
for-profit or nonprofit, and the fund finances the students' educations. 53
Instead of repaying principal and interest, students repay the fund a
46. Is There Ever a Time During the ParticipationPeriod When I Wouldn't Need to Share
Income?, supra note 45.
47. Can Talent Exit the Pave IPA Early?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/h/en-us/articles/
200478356-Will-I-be-able-to-exit-the-Pave-IPA-early- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
48. Our Model, PAVE, http://www.pave.com/funding-model, archived at http://perma.cc/
R33Z-SR5N (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); What are the Expected Financial Returns?, PAVE
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200678278-What-are-the-expected-financial-returns(May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
49. See infra Part V.
50. Introducing the Pave Loan: A Letter from Our Founders (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://blog.pave.com/post/94752393200/introducing-the-pave-loan-a-letter-from-our, archived at
http://perma.cc/NQ7D-TH5T. Portions of the Pave website continue, as of March 25, 2015, to refer
to the income-linked payment agreements, Pave's ISA. See PAVE, https://www.pave.com/
introduction/backer, archived at http://perma.cc/GZZ9-5JQH (last visited March 25, 2015).
Presumably existing ISAs remain active, continuing to run through to term (up to ten years).
51. See also ENZI, supranote 20.
52. About Lumni, supranote 7.
53.

Id.
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fixed percentage of future income for ten years after graduation, and
the fund distributes a return to the investor. 54 Lumni characterizes its
structure as a "win-win partnership" between students and investors. 5 5
Lumni launched in Chile in 2002 and since then has expanded
to Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and the United States.5 6 Thus, unlike the
other market participants, Lumni originated overseas and has been in
operation for a number of years.5 7 Lumni also works with corporations
that fund the education of children of employees and distributors,
though it is unclear whether any of these ventures have launched in the
United States to date.5 8
Lumni is the brainchild of Professor Miguel Palacios. 59 Building
on Milton Friedman's work,60 Palacios has argued that human capital
contracts are a superior way of funding higher education because they
reduce risk for students, improve information and decisionmaking
regarding the value of education, and increase competition in the higher
education market. 61 Lumni reflects Palacios's underlying vision.
b. 13th Avenue Funding
13th Avenue Funding is a nonprofit that fosters communitybased education funding programs. 62 Like Lumni, 13th Avenue's
system funds education by requiring students to pay a percentage of
future income, rather than repay the original loan through a fixed

&

54. Id.
55. Id.; For Students, LUMNI, http://www.lumni.net/forstudents/, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q4MK-T7GV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
56. LUMNI, supra note 7; Our Story, LUMNI, http://www.lumniusa.net/about/our-story,
archived at http://perma.cc/XX3L-HL74 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
57.
Since 2009, Lumni has funded twenty-seven U.S. students. Kate Bachelder, Escaping
the Student Debt Trap, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weekendinterview-escaping-the-student-debt-trap-1402699281. It has funded almost five thousand
students total since 2002. Id.; see also LUMNI, supranote 7; Our Story, supra note 56.
58. For Corporations, LUMNI,
http://www.lumni.net/forcorporations,
archived at
http://perma.cc/5P4M-86PT (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
59. See MIGUEL PALAcIOS LLERAS, INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL (2004); Miguel Palacios,
Human Capital Contracts: "Equity-like" Instruments for Financing Higher Education, POL'Y
ANALYSIS No. 462, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://lumni.net/about/palacios.pdf, archived at
http://perma.ccl87HB-5AJV; see also PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14, at 1.
60. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); see also Friedman
Kuznets, supra note 10, at 90 n.20 (noting that "if individuals sold 'stock' in themselves, i.e.,
obligated themselves to pay a fixed proportion of future earnings, investors could 'diversify' their
holdings and balance capital appreciations against capital losses').
61. PALACIOS LLERAS, supra note 59, at xviii; PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note
14; Palacios supranote 59, at 1.
62.
13TH AVENUE FUNDING, supranote 7.
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monthly amount. 63 However, 13th Avenue's model is distinctive
because the financing relationship is local: funding providers invest in
members of the same community.6 4 Thus, 13th Avenue's model may
bear a stronger resemblance to informal funding arrangements among
friends and family than might be the case with some other ISAs.
Founded in 2009, 13th Avenue piloted its program at Allan
Hancock College in Santa Maria, California.6 5 It hopes that its funding
model can be extrapolated for use by other local community groups. To
that end, 13th Avenue has made its deal documents publicly available
for free use under a creative commons license, together with
instructions for how to create one's own "college financing community"
in other local communities.6 6
c. Leff-Hughes Swap Transaction
In another variation on the ISA concept, Professors Benjamin
Leff and Heather Hughes have proposed an income-based rate swap
("IBR swap") as a mechanism for financing legal education. 67 Under this
proposal, the student would still borrow from the government or banks
to finance their legal education.6 8 But then the student would enter into
a contract with a financial institution under which that financial

63. See id. Payment is not required if the student is out of work. Id.
64. Id.; see also Rick Cohen, A Venture Capital Model to Pay for College Student Loans,
NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 6, 2013, 3:18 PM), available at https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocialcontext/22709-a-venture-capital-model-to-pay-for-college-student-loans.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZZ7T-935E ("[T]he 13th Avenue concept is meant to help first-generation immigrant
college students and low-income students."); Laura Matthews, Student Loan Debt Crisis:A New
Nonprofit 13th Avenue Wants an America Without College Loans, INT'L Bus. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2013,
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/student-loan-debt-crisis-new-nonprofit-13th-avenue-wantsamerica-without-college-loans-1366729, archived at http://perma.cc/L584-9U5Q (describing 13th
Avenue's focus on community building and "pay[ing] it forward").
65. Our Pilot Program, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http://13thavenuefunding.org/styled/
index.html, archived at http://perma.ccl6F99-FN92 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); see Matthews,
supra note 64.
66. How to Build Your Own College Financing Community, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING,
http://13thavenuefunding.org/styled-2/index.html, archived at http://perma.ccUTP8-STM3 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015). 13th Avenue has made available on its website sample contracts between
(1) the sponsoring community organization and the student and (2) the sponsoring organization
and
the
funding
provider.
The Documents, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING,
http://
13thavenuefunding.org/styled-5/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3NKQ-GY9D, (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
67. Benjamin M. Leff & Heather Hughes, The Income-Based Repayment Swap: A New
Method for Funding Law School Education (Jul. 9, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2291714; see also Jacob Gershman, Placing
Bets on Law School Graduates, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (July 19, 2013; 3:57 P.M.), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/07/19/placing-bets-on-law-school-graduates/.
68. Leff & Hughes, supra note 67, at 11-19 (describing the IBR swap).
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institution would assume responsibility for making the student's law
school loan repayments. 69 In exchange, the student would agree to pay
the financial institution a percentage of her future earnings over a fixed
time period. 70 The financial institution would make a profit when a
student ends up in a high-paying job (e.g., Biglaw partner) but would
experience a loss on students who do not find employment or who enter
low-paying jobs. Leff and Hughes argue that the IBR swap contains the
benefits of more traditional ISAs or human capital contracts but can
help reduce the legal and regulatory barriers associated with ISAs.71
They do note, however, that the IBR swap may also create adverse
selection and moral hazard problems and may create inequities in
student admissions and financial aid decisions. 72
d. Government Income- Contingent Repayment Plans
The income sharing concept has found its way into the
government-provided higher education funding sector as well.
Responding to rising student debt loads, the U.S. government
introduced in 2009 a federal income-based repayment ("IBR") program
for education loans, which permitted qualifying students to cap
repayments on eligible student loans at fifteen percent of discretionary
income.7 3 Payments would be made monthly for twenty-five years, after
which the loan would be forgiven.7 4 For qualifying new borrowers on or
after July 1, 2014, the repayment percentage dropped to ten percent,
and the repayment term dropped to twenty years.75 The government
also introduced the Pay As You Earn (or "PAYE") plan in 2012 for
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 19-50.
72. Id. at 50-58.
73. See Income-Driven Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/repayloans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn#monthly-payments, archived at http://perma.cc/HB9RSWVS (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (summarizing income-driven repayment plans). Discretionary
income is, generally, adjusted gross income minus 150 percent of the poverty line. Glossary, FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/glossary#DiscretionaryIncome, archived at http://
perma.ccRJ8X-PLHP (last visited Jan. 18, 2015); see also College Cost Reduction and Access Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 203, 121 Stat. 784, 792-94 (2007) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012)
(income-based repayment)). See generally John R. Brooks II, Income-Based Repayment and the
Public Financing of Higher Education (Oct. 20, 2014) (unpublished paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2513359 (examining and evaluating IBR's
tax-like characteristics).
74. Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73. Under current tax law, this would give rise to
cancellation of debt income. I.R.C. § 108 (2012). See Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73 (noting
that "you may be required to pay income tax on any amount that is forgiven .. ."). But see I.R.C.
§ 108(f) (exception for student loans where individual works for certain employers).
75. Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73.
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qualified new borrowers.7 6 PAYE caps payments at ten percent and
forgives the debt after twenty years.77 For students holding public
service jobs, any remaining debt on Direct Loans under IBR, PAYE, or
another income-driven repayment plan is cancelled after 120 qualifying
payments.7 8
These plans share two features: the student's monthly loan
payment is capped, and students are eligible only if the incomecontingent payment is less than what they would have to pay under the
standard student loan repayment plan. Thus, unlike the private sector
models, these income-contingent plans hold no upside for the
government. It has been pointed out that the government may actually
be outcompeting the private market for ISAs in providing income-based
repayment plans with no upside. 79
e. State-Based Alternatives
Finally, states have also begun exploring creative education
financing alternatives. In 2013, Oregon passed a bill directing the
Oregon Higher Education Coordinating Commission ("HECC") to
consider the creation of a new pilot program under which students
attending Oregon state colleges and universities would not pay tuition
but instead a percentage of their income for a certain time period. 80 The
bill did not establish payment percentages or durations."' The proposed
pilot design was created in September 2014.82 In its transmittal letter
to the Oregon legislature, the HECC noted that this "Pay It Forward"
pilot was "a worthy initiative for the Oregon Legislature to undertake,
subject to the availability of funding over and above [the Legislature's]

76. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2014). "New borrowers" are borrowers who did not owe money on a
federal student loan as of October 1, 2007, and received a Direct Loan disbursement on or after
Oct. 1, 2011. Id.
77. Id.; Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73.
78. Income-Driven Plans, supranote 73; PublicService Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service, archived at
http://perma.cc/2ZDS-VD8T (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
79.
See Megan McArdle, When Education Doesn't Pay, BLOOMBERGVIEW (May 13, 2014, 2:27
P.M.) http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-13/when-education-doesn-t-pay, archived
at http://perma.cc/WCH3-989K.
80. See White, supra note 8; see also PAY IT FORWARD WORKGROUP, HOUSE BILL 3472: PAY
IT FORWARD (2014) available at http://education.oregon.gov/Documents/HECC/Student%
20Success/8-13-14/PIF%20Report%20Draft%208-7-14d.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccVW65M7VK (draft report).
81. H.B. 3472, 77th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
82.

HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING COMM'N, HOUSE BILL 3472: PAY IT FORWARD, 1-2 (2014),

available at http://library.state.or.us/repository/2014/201410231424054/.

698

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:681

core investment priorities." 83 The HECC recommended that the pilot
program be undertaken provided that certain funding and other
conditions are met. 84 Other states are looking into comparable

legislative options, and proposed federal legislation in the 113th
Congress would have directed feasibility studies and matching grants
at the federal level (among other recommendations).8 5
B. Related Economic Arrangements
ISAs clearly represent a new wave of human capital
interactions, but in some respects they resemble arrangements that
have existed in the past or are operating today. 86 At a most basic level,
families and communities have long invested informally in their youth
in exchange for reciprocal repayments in the future. Assisted by
technology platforms, however, such income sharing is how occurring
on a larger scale and with more formalization. This shift demands a
more robust legal and normative analysis. Before undertaking that
analysis, however, it is useful to survey historical antecedents and
related present-day transactions in order to situate ISAs in context.

83.
Letter from Higher Educ. Coordinating Comm'n to Legislator (Sept. 24, 2014)
available at http://education.oregon.gov/Documents/HECC/Reports%20and%20Presentations/
HECCTransmissionLetterPIF.pdMobile=1&Source=%2F_1ayouts%2Fmobile%2Fdispform%2Ea
spx%3FList%3Dfb5lbf5d-4277-431c-8e43-d3c923ec0al3%26View%3D123a0c05-35ed-4887-aef03a43aa5bOfc9%26RootFolder%3D%252FDocuments%252FHECC%252FReports%2520and%2520
Presentations%261D%3D785%26CurrentPage%3DI,
archived at http://perma.cc/F39W-LBPU
(transmission letter to HECC report).
84. See HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING COMM'N, supra note 82, at 9.
85.
H.R. 3959, 113th Cong. (as introduced in the house Jan. 29, 2014); Thomas L. Harnisch,
The "PayIt Forward"College FinancingConcept: A Pathway to the Privatizationof Public Higher
Education, POL'Y MATTERS, July 2014, at 4, available at http://www.aascu.org/
policy/publications/policy-matters/PayltForward.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/9682-7MK2
(describing status of similar legislation in various states); ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE,
PAY IT FORWARD: AN UPDATE ON NATIONAL PROGRESS, (2014), http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-

content/uploads/Update-on-national-progressl.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/9C8N-D39W
(reviewing status of legislative efforts underway in other states); see also AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF AN ILLINOIS PAY IT FORWARD PROGRAM, AS DIRECTED BY PUBLIC ACT 98-920,

REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.isac.org/dotAsset/1b1c678e-6a2e-463cbfaa-f3265d9c87ec.pdf.
86.
Friedman & Kuznets, supra note 10, at 90 n.20; see also Bas Jacobs & Sweder J.G. van
Wijnbergen, Capital-Market Failure, Adverse Selection, and Equity Financing of Higher
Education, 63 FINANZARCHIV: PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2007) (reviewing the challenges of using
human capital contracts); J.R. Walsh, Capital Concept Applied to Man, 49 Q.J. ECON. 255, 256
(1935) (examining "whether money spent in acquiring such training is, in a strict sense, a capital
investment made in a profit-seeking, equalizing market, in response to the same motives which
lead to the creation of factories, machinery, and the like").
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1. Portland's "IPO Man"
In a parallel yet idiosyncratic development, at least one
individual has created "shares" in himself and sold them to investors.8 7
Mike Merrill of Portland, Oregon, commenced this share offering in
2008, and the shares are outstanding to this day.88 Merrill shares can
be bought and traded on his personal stock exchange and are owned by
friends, family, and strangers.8 9 The shares are not backed by a
company and are a high-risk investment. 90 Merrill's own website states
that the investment is not safe. 91 In fact, the website describes the
ownership of Merrill shares as "just a metaphor for trust" and as a
"personal decision-making engine modeled after a stock market" that
"measure[s] influence as the number of shares a person has."9 2

As a result of this stock offering, Merrill has experienced
competing shareholder interests, stock price manipulation, and
investors' decisions at the expense of his well-being.9 3 Ever since a
shareholder complained about not being consulted when Merrill moved
in with his then-girlfriend 9 4-a decision that could impact his creative
output and put investor capital at risk-Merrill has allowed
shareholders to vote on various matters affecting his personal life. To
date, shareholders have decided (1) whom Merrill should date, (2) that
he must register as a Republican, (3) that he should become a
vegetarian, (4) that he should stop sleeping through the night, and
(5) that he should not get a vasectomy. 95 In addition to voting rights,
each share generates a potential return on profits earned outside of
Merrill's day job.9 6 Merrill's shareholders have also approved a motion

87. Joshua Davis, Meet the Man Who Sold His Fate to Investors at $1 a Share, WIRED (Mar.
28, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/ipo-man/, archived at http://perma.cclHE26-G5MR; Rob
Walker, How One Man Turned Himself into a Publicly Owned Company, ATLANTIC, April 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/putting-the-i-in-ipo/309255/,
archived at
http://perma.cc/FEW6-DPXG.
88. See Davis, supra note 87.
89.
See Walker, supra note 87; see also KMIKEYM, www.KmikeyM.com, archived at
http://perma.cc/XR4T-NEUM (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (exchange for shares in Merrill).
90.
See About, KMIKEYM, http://urbanhonking.com/kmikeym/about/, archived at http://
perma.cclUE2K-GLVW (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
91. Id.; see also Nicole Goodkind, Human IPO: Man Sells Himself for $10,000, YAHOO! FIN.
(Apr. 22, 2013, 8:10 A.M.), http://finance.yahoo.comfblogs/daily-ticker/sell-yourself-10-000135455858.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TQ6D-8PVW (share issuance not legally binding).

92.

About, supra note 90.

93.
94.
95.
96.

See Davis, supra note 87.
See Walker, supra note 87.
Davis, supra note 87.
Id.
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that, in the event of Merrill's death, his life insurance proceeds would
be distributed among themselves.9 7
Although the Merrill transaction may seem more like reality
television than a serious financial investment, it is a useful reminder of
the range of structuring possibilities in today's technological
environment, the power that investors can have over a person's
decisions, the potential consequences of applying the share economy to
an individual, and the uncertainty surrounding the regulation of
equity-like investments in people.
2. Baseball Buscones
ISAs have also been compared to various athlete-agent
relationships, particularly in professional baseball recruitment but in
other professional sports contexts as well. 98 With respect to professional
baseball, MLB teams have historically profited by cheaply signing
Caribbean-born players.9 9 While Major League Rules require North
American and Puerto Rican players to enter the First-Year Player
Draft, international players are exempt.1 00 Thus, there are few
restrictions on how they are recruited and signed. 101
The absence of regulation has spawned an industry of local
street agents known as buscones.102 Buscones promise to develop the
talent of young boys until they are eligible to sign with an MLB team,
providing training, food, lodging, 103 and representation. 104 In exchange,
the buscone gets a percentage (often between ten and thirty percent) of

97. Id.
98. See Rob Ruck, Baseball's Recruitment Abuses, AMERICAS Q., Summer 2011,
http://americasquarterly.org/node/2745, archived at http://perma.cclRML2-HDHB (describing the
relationships between athletes and their agents).
99. Kevin Baxter, Dominican Shift, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/
2008/apr/15/sports/sp-dominicansl5, archived at http://perma.cc/J78P-MNM2 (discussing how
signing bonuses for players from the Dominican Republic were beginning to increase after many
years of extremely low payments); Ruck, supra note 98 (describing how signing bonuses have
spiraled to an average of about $131,000 in 2011 compared to an average of $2,000-$5,000 in 1990).
100. Ruck, supranote 98; see 2012-2016 BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS
AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, attachment 46, § I, available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/kba.english.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc[M3LL-L2J4 (explaining the
potential for addition of an international players draft).
101. Ruck, supra note 98.
102. Most MLB teams today rely on buscones. Baxter, supra note 99.
103. Ruck, supranote 98.
104. Sean Gregory, BaseballDreams: Striking Out in the DominicanRepublic, TIME, July 26,
2010, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,917 1,2004099- 1,00.html, archived at http://
perma.ccIY9WC-AN65.
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the signing bonus if the player signs professionally. 105 Though primarily
active overseas, buscone relationships have occurred domestically as
well. 106
The growth in the buscone industry has arguably improved
prospects' ability to negotiate with MLB teams, driving signing bonuses
higher.10 7 But it has also created ethical issues leading the MLB to
investigate1 0 8 exploitation, discontinuation of schooling, provision of
performance enhancing drugs, age misrepresentation, and overcrowded
and substandard training facilities. 109
The story of buscones holds a cautionary tale for ISAs.
Individuals with limited current options but some future potential may
have no choice but to promise a cut of their future earnings in order to
improve their chances of securing that successful future. But
monetization of future human capital may lead to exploitation, given
power imbalances and information asymmetries. The question, then, is
how the benefits of ISAs should be weighed against their potential
risks.
3. Bowie Bonds
Parallels may also be drawn between so-called "Bowie Bonds"
and the new ISAs. In 1997, David Bowie became the first musician to
securitize his intellectual property rights in a bond offering.1 10 Bowie
105. Jorge L. Ortiz, Exploitation, Steroids HittingHome in DominicanRepublic, USA TODAY,
Mar. 26, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2009-03-26-dominican-republiccoverN.htm?csp=Forbes, archivedat http://perma.cc/6N8A-Y9JP; Ruck, supra note 98.
106. Kyle Finck & Christian Red, 'Buscones', or Street Agents, Shape Young Baseball
Talent . . . for a Price, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/
baseball/buscones-street-agents-shape-young-baseball-talent-price-article- 1.465231, archived at
http://perma.cc/X26C-2SYT.
107. In 1990, MLB teams signed three hundred Dominican prospects for an average bonus of
$2,500. In the first four months of 2011, MLB signed 188 Dominican prospects for an average of
about $131,000. Ruck, supranote 98.
108. Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Emissary to Review Troubled Dominican Pipeline, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
10,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/1 1/sports/baseball/
l1dominican.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/THY9-TKFJ; Ruck, supra note 98; see 20122016 BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 100, art XII (discipline rules).
109. See Gregory, supranote 104; Ruck, supranote 98; Schmidt, supranote 108. See generally
Manuel Jimenez, Miami Doping Scandal Casts Pall over Dominican Baseball, REUTERS, (Aug. 8,
2013) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/18/us-baseball-doping-dominicanidUSBRE97HO5920130818, archived at http://perma.cc/2MMH-SFEF (observing that up to
ninety-eight percent of Dominican prospects do not make it to the major leagues). Prospects who
do not make it to the major leagues return to the Dominican Republic without the education or
skills necessary to enter the workforce. Gregory, supra note 104.
110. Michael R. McCabe, You Have Now Entered the Bowie Bond Era, SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET, July 1997, http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/smm/july97/pdfs/mccabe.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cclY9P2-MNYJ.
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issued bonds in order to accelerate payment of royalties from his
music."' Bowie sold certain catalogue rights, including the rights to
future royalty payments, to a bankruptcy-remote special purpose
vehicle ("SPV").112 Borrowing against future royalty income, the SPV
raised $55 million.11 3 The SPV repaid its lender the principal plus 7.9
percent annual interest for a period of years out of the royalties received
from the music catalogue. 114 Once the negotiated figure was repaid, the
royalties reverted back to Bowie." 5 Because the bond issuance was
private, there was no SEC registration and no publicly available
prospectus.11 6

Despite the fact that the Bowie transaction was clearly an asset
securitization structured as debt, it has prompted comparisons to ISAs
because both are instances of someone transferring rights to future
earnings in exchange for a current payment. Bowie Bonds involved the
transfer of intellectual property rights and associated royalties, rather
than, say, a percentage of future wages. However, the similarities and
differences between the Bowie transaction and ISAs help pinpoint the
contexts in which transfers of future earnings may be worrisome.
4. Yale's "Tuition Postponement Program"
Finally, ISAs have antecedents in Yale University's "Tuition
Postponement Program," which included an income-contingent
payment feature.11 7 Yale students could enter the program from 1971
to 1976, after which it was discontinued (although the repayment plan
continued for existing students into the 2000s)."18 Under the terms of
this voluntary program, participating students agreed to pay 0.4
percent of their future earnings for every thousand dollars borrowed.
Payments would be due for thirty-five years or until the debt of their
111. Ian Brodie, Bowie Sells Royalties for 55m to Wall Street, TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 1997,
at 3; Future Shock? Investors Bet on Rocker's Royalties, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1997, at 04D,
availableat 1997 WLNR 3050052; Jay Matthews, Securities Oddity: The Bowie Bond; with AssetBacked Debt, the Rock StarPlays FinancialInstrument, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at C1, available
at 1997 WLNR 7363281; Matt Morris, Royalty Securitizations: Were Bowie Bonds Just a Fad?,
CAPITAL FORMATION INST., http://www.cfi-institute.org/VP%20-%2ORoyalty%2OSecuritizations%
20-%2OMorris.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XX6V-MSAJ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
112. See Morris, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. Id. Bowie's music catalogue was pledged as collateral in the event of SPV default. Id.
115. See Future Shock?, supranote 111.
116. Jennifer Burke Sylva, Bowie Bonds Sold for FarMore Than a Song: The Securitizationof
Intellectual Property as a Super-Charged Vehicle for High Technology Financing, 15 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 206 (1999).
117. See PALACIOS LLERAS, supra note 59, at 43-47, 123-25.
118. Id. at 123-24.
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class had been paid, whichever occurred first.1 19 Ultimately, several
factors contributed to dissatisfaction with the program, including its
duration and the effect of redistribution within the program depending
on the compliance of other participants. 120
In sum, the present wave of ISAs has antecedents in similar
transactions that have occurred in the past and also relates to parallel,
present-day developments in human capital investing. We mention
some of these transactions and developments in order to situate the new
ISAs in historical context but also to pinpoint their distinguishing
features. Unlike previous generations of transactions, the new ISAs are
more widespread and can be found across the education,
entrepreneurship, and professional sports sectors. They are easily
accessed via technological platforms and are being offered both by the
private sector and by government. Accordingly, the new ISAs impact a
broader range of participants than previous generations of
transactions. Thus, closer attention to the regulatory issues they raise
is warranted.
C. Relationship to Crowdfunding
Having described the development of ISAs and their
antecedents, it is important to discuss how ISAs relate to parallel
developments in crowdfunding. "Crowdfunding" is not a technical
financing term but is instead a combination of two existing concepts:
"crowdsourcing" and "microlending." 12 1 Crowdsourcing generally means
obtaining services or ideas from a large group of contributors over the
Internet, 122 and "microlending" refers to the practice of lending small
amounts of money to poor borrowers.1 23 The marriage of the two
produces crowdfunding: small contributions from many people to fund
entrepreneurial projects. 124
119. See William E. Curran, Yale's Tuition Postponement Option, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 283 (1973).
120. PALACIOs LLERAS, supra note 59, at 126-27; Bret Ladine, '70s Debt Program Finally
Ending, YALE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2001, http://yaledailynews.comIblog/2001/03/27/70s-debtprogram-finally-ending/, archived at http://perma.cclW27W-VVT2.
121. The phrase "crowdfunding" did not appear until 2006. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding
and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L REV. 1, 11, 27 (citing Kevin Lawton & Dan
Marom, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 3

(2010)).
122. Bradford, supranote 121, at 27 (quoting Tina Rosenberg, Crowdsourcinga Better World,
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.comi
2011/03/28/crowdsourcing-a-better-world/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0),
archived at http://
perma.cc/K8MQ-CYXQ).
123.

MUHAMMED YUNUS & ALAN JOLIS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE

BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (2008); Bradford, supra note 121, at 28-29.
124. Bradford, supra note 121, at 29.
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Commentators have identified four types of crowdfunding:
donative, reward-based, lending-based, and equity-based. 125 Donative
crowdfunding (which is not limited to nonprofits) offers contributors
nothing in exchange for their contribution.1 2 6 In reward-based
crowdfunding, contributors are promised goods or services in exchange
for their contribution. 127 In the lending-based model, the crowdfunder
is repaid over time; thus, federal securities laws might apply. 128 Finally,
equity-based crowdfunding generally refers to the issuance of corporate
stock in the startup through a crowdfunding site. Due to securities and
regulatory issues, equity crowdfunding has been described as
"practically nonexistent in the United States." 129 Legislation enacted in
2012130 sought to provide a registration exemption for equity
crowdfunding. Whether the proposed SEC regulations1 31 implementing
that legislation will be sufficient to make equity crowdfunding feasible
remains debated. 132
The key question for our purposes is how, if at all, crowdfunding
legislation impacts ISAs. The short answer is that while the
crowdfunding exemption may apply to some ISAs, it likely will not
apply to all ISAs. Moreover, efforts to provide clarity in securities
regulation and protect investors, while valuable, do not address the
protection of funding seekers-the young persons, entrepreneurs, and
students who have monetized their human capital. Finally, the
crowdfunding literature simply does not address the most fundamental
normative question raised by ISAs: what does it mean that ISA
investors are not investing in a company, an activity, or a business but

125. See id. at 31-35; see also Christine Hurt, Price Disintermediation:Crowdfunding and
Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 233-34; Mary M. Shepro, Keeping the Crowd at
Bay: The PracticeImplications of the SEC's New Crowdfunding Exemption, 1, 9 (May 5, 2014)
(unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433225.
126. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 121, at 31-32; Shepro, supra note 125, at 10 (providing
GoFundMe.com as an example of a purely donative crowdfunding site).
127. Kickstarter, a popular crowdfunding site, operates on the reward-based model;
entrepreneurs offer rewards (such as copies of the book or film created) in exchange for support.
See https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer, archived at http://perma.cc/C46N-U5DB (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015).
128. See Bradford, supra note 121, at 34-42.
129. See Shepro, supra note 125, at 10-11 (citing MASSSOLUTION, 2013CF CROWDFUNDING
MARKET OUTLOOK REPORT (July 2013)). However, because partnership and LLC interests can
constitute securities, even sites that do not offer corporate stock may be subject to costly regulation
under current rules.
130. Jump Start Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Title III, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
131. Regulation Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66427 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
132. See, e.g., Shepro, supra note 125, at 18-24.

HUMAN EQUITY

2015]

705

rather the totality of a person's human capital? Such questions are the
focus of this Article.

In sum, Part II has surveyed the universe of current ISAs and
discussed their antecedents and related transactions. The foregoing
discussion shows that ISAs are not completely new. However, in the
past, informal income sharing transactions occurred more sporadically
and locally and for the most part flew under the regulatory radar. We
have now arguably reached a tipping point where technological
advances and a financing crunch have led to the proliferation of ISAs
on a wider scale.
The law is just starting to tackle the normative and regulatory
issues these transactions raise. Current law lacks both an analytical
framework and a substantive approach for understanding, evaluating,
and characterizing them. Developments in the regulation of
crowdfunding, while informative, do not address many of the key issues.
There is clearly a demand for regulatory guidance, as demonstrated by
the discontinuation of the Upstart transaction due to regulatory
uncertainty 3 3 and the introduction of the Rubio-Petri Bill. 134 The
remainder of this Article elaborates on why, despite the desire for
regulatory certainty, a case-by-case approach that regulates ISAs by
analogy is the better path.

III.

EVALUATING AND CHARACTERIZING THE TRANSACTIONS

ISAs raise two distinct but related issues: (1) how they should be
regarded as a normative, public policy matter, and (2) how we should
design their legal treatment and regulation. At the outset, both issues
present a fundamental choice: Can we make broad normative
statements about the desirability of ISAs and enact overarching legal
and regulatory schemes by which to govern them? Or, alternatively,

133. With regard to Pave, the public portion of the Pave website, which has always been less
open, transparent, and detailed than that of Upstart, appears now only to offer a loan version.
However, there are Pave webpages still accessible online that continue the description of an income
share opportunity. See, e.g., Payback Process, PAVE, https://www.pave.com/learn-more#paybackprocess, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8X7-4Y4V (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
134. Investing in Student Success Act of 2014, H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (as introduced on Apr.
9, 2014); see also supra note 27; PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14.
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should their normative evaluation and legal treatment be considered
and articulated on a case-by-case basis?135
Fueled by a desire for regulatory certainty, there has emerged a
nascent trend in favor of an overarching, unified regulatory
approach. 136 This approach has largely been advocated by legislators
and policymakers who seek to provide regulatory certainty and a
favorable regulatory environment for the ISA sector to develop. A
unified approach may appear a natural solution given the seemingly
distinctive economics of ISAs, as compared with more traditional
methods of individual financing. This Article argues, however, that we
should resist such a unified approach at this stage because, in its effort
to secure certainty, the unified approach ignores potential risks posed
by ISAs and creates unnecessary substantive law discontinuities. With
respect to both normative evaluation and regulatory design, a case-bycase approach offers a better opportunity for thoughtful regulation with
meaningful certainty. A case-by-case analysis that is performed by each
regulatory field is preferable because (1) ISAs are heterogeneous
transactions with different underlying economics, and (2) ISAs may
resemble a number of preexisting transactions, many of which already
have established legal and regulatory treatments. Furthermore, it is
possible to provide sufficient regulatory certainty while choosing a caseby-case approach.
Part III develops the argument that a case-by-case approach
that proceeds by analogy to familiar regulatory categories is preferable
at this juncture. Part III.A argues that a case-by-case approach is useful
both in the normative evaluation of ISAs and in assessing their
regulatory treatment. Parts III.B and III.C broadly describe the
universe of key commercial transactions analogous to ISAs. Part III.B
focuses on two analytical extremes: (1) the notion that ISAs
approximate slavery or servitude, and (2) the idea that ISAs are no
different from traditional debt. Part III.C then discusses other potential
analogies.

135. A third possibility is to not regulate ISAs at all. However, not subjecting ISAs to any
regulatory oversight is unrealistic in today's environment. Moreover, at least with respect to some
areas of law (e.g., tax and bankruptcy), deciding the correct approach is not optional.
136. See, e.g., PALAcIOs, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14.
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A. Policy Issues Raised by ISAs and the Case for a
Case-By- Case Approach
Part III.A first surveys the policy issues raised by ISAs and
argues for case-by-case normative evaluation. It then discusses why
case-by-case regulation by analogy is the preferable approach.
1. Policy Issues Raised by ISAs and the Case for Case-by-Case
Normative Evaluation
Commentators-including journalists, bloggers, lawmakers,
public intellectuals, and the offering enterprises themselves-have
described ISAs in a number of different ways.137 These descriptions
span the analytical spectrum, from the very pernicious (e.g., indentured
servitude) to the quite banal (e.g., contingent debt or insurance). Each
of these descriptions of ISAs carries different policy implications. The
wide range of descriptions, paired with the strength of commentator
reactions, suggests that ISAs are commercially and socially complicated
and contested.
Advocates of ISAs, including U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and
former U.S. Representative Tom Petri, believe that ISAs offer a more
realistic means for financing higher education than traditional loans,
which may leave students overindebted. 3 8 The ISA model removes the
student's fixed obligation to repay principal, although at the "price" of
surrendering a portion of the upside. 1 39 Some argue that ISAs
incentivize students to make better educational decisions.1 40 Others
claim that the ISA sector taps into new sources of credit and makes it
easier for entrepreneurs to obtain funding for a project or venture. Yet
others suggest that these transactions enable funders to invest in
communities. 141 Still others characterize certain ISAs as a method of

137. See infra Part III.B and III.C.
138. See, e.g., Drew Sandholm, For Rubio, Student Loan Bill Is Personal, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2014,
12:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.comlid/101568230, archived at http://perma.cc/4VYV-NCTX;
INVESTING

IN

STUDENT

SUCCESS

ACT

OF

2014

FACT

SHEET,

available

at

https://

web.archive.org/web/20141219075210/https://petri.house.gov/sites/petri.house.gov/iles/document
s/InvestingInStudentSuccess-FACTSHEET.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XVZ8-LWNU (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015). Professor Miguel Palacios is a proponent of this view.
139. See, e.g., Palacios, supra note 59.
140. Bachelder, supra note 57; see also Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 530 (2013) (arguing that risk-based student loans would act as a price
signal, improving students' ability to make informed decisions regarding how financial risks differ
between courses of study).
141. 13TH AVE FUNDING, supranote 7 ("Finance your education without debt-use our locally
controlled, equity based technology to send members of your community through college.").
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insuring against earnings shocks.14 2 These commentaries suggest that
ISAs may have a number of advantages over traditional methods of
individual financing.
On the other hand, several concerns and critiques have been
raised concerning the emerging ISA sector. Detractors argue that ISAs
create unacceptable ownership stakes in the young at the outset of their
careers, akin to indentured servitude. 143 Some suggest that ISAs allow
corporations to own people. 144 Such ownership may, in their view,
approximate slavery.1 4 5 Detractors voice particular concern about
consumer protection issues surrounding young people or those
desperate for funding, who may make poor decisions.1 46 Even if these
transactions do not rise to the level of slavery or servitude, they may
raise important questions regarding personal autonomy, free choice,
and self-determination. Commentators have also pointed out the likely
inequities in who gets funded (e.g., based on race, gender, or profession),
as well as potential design flaws (moral hazard and adverse selection in
the pool of funding seekers).1 4 7 This increased risk to funding providers
may result in ISAs being more costly for funding recipients than
currently envisioned. As a result, some have emphasized the
importance of consumer protection of funding recipients.1 4 8
This Article does not purport to undertake a comprehensive
survey of the types of policy issues raised by ISAs. The discussion here
142. Katie Baker, Jocks & Bonds: Does the Arian Foster IPO Really Give Fans a Chance to
Buy a Piece of an NFL Superstar?, GRANTLAND (Oct. 30, 2013), http://grantland.com/features/thearian-foster-ipo-fantex/, archived at http://perma.cc/PL68-MAGE ("The Fantex model can be
looked at as an insurance policy of sorts to pros, particularly in the NFL, where contracts are not
guaranteed and the average career length is less than four years."); Mike Florio, Company Plans
to Sell Stock in Players, Starting with Arian Foster, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/17/company-plans-to-sell-stock-in-players-startingwith-arian-foster/, archivedat http://perma.cc/ZS74-6H73 (characterizing Fantex as "an insurance
policy of sorts, paid in advance"); Sean Gregory, Be Very Careful Buying Arian FosterShares, TIME
(Oct. 18, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/10/18/be-very-careful-buyingarian-foster-shares/, archived at http://perma.cc/C6P3-TGZY (noting the insurance function of
Fantex). See also, generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DuKE L.J. 1285, 1319-24
(2011) (discussing equity interests in future earnings as a non-insurance example of a "riskallocating transaction" or "risk/expected value exchange").
143. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39:59) (discussing potential funding
inequities based on demographic characteristics); see also PALAcIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra
note 14, at 10 (discussing possible funding inequities). For example, there is a worry that funding
recipients may have an incentive to choose leisure over work, take lower paying jobs, or accept
hometown discounts upon receiving the funds, thus compromising the return on the investment of
funding providers.
148. See Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 35:59-39:59).
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is simply a brief overview of the types of issues ISAs may present. What
is clear at the outset is that ISAs are contested and complicated
transactions. They are also heterogeneous, so not all ISAs will raise the
exact same policy concerns. Ultimately, whether a given agreement is
desirable or problematic will depend in part on the economic terms of
that particular contract, the circumstances surrounding its creation,
and the relationship between the contracting parties. Because ISAs are
not monolithic, it is difficult to make sweeping normative statements
about ISAs as a whole. For that reason, we suggest that each contract
should be normatively evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Comparison,
analogy, and classification can be useful in this normative evaluation.
Comparing ISAs to more familiar transactions can help clarify potential
arguments and concerns, because we can piggyback on implicit or
explicit normative assessments of existing categories in deciding how
we feel about specific ISAs. Comparison and analogy can also help
pinpoint-based on careful examination of the economics underlying
each discrete transaction-whether and when a particular transaction
raises concerns. For example, understanding how a given ISA is or is
not like insurance can help clarify whether it is plausible to argue that
ISAs allow smoothing of earnings and consumption shocks.
Understanding how an ISA may or may not resemble indentured
servitude may illuminate the potential ethical problems that it creates.
In sum, thinking about how ISAs compare with arrangements
with which we are familiar can help us better understand and articulate
our normative attitudes towards them. Of course, merely drawing
analogies is insufficient. Some new ISAs may raise fresh issues that
existing transactions do not implicate. The process of analogizing may
also force us to rethink the wisdom of our longstanding acceptance of
familiar financial transactions. Our narrower point is that the work of
analogy and comparison can serve as a heuristic in helping us frame
and evaluate the new ISAs in a quickly changing landscape.
2. The Case for Case-By-Case Regulation by Analogy
With respect to designing the legal and regulatory treatment of
ISAs, a case-by-case approach that draws analogies to preexisting
transactions is also likely to be preferable. 14 9

149. See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supranote 15 (borrowing products liability concepts to
suggest consumer credit regulation approaches).
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a. Benefits of Regulation by Analogy
Regulation of ISAs by analogy to more familiar arrangements is
advisable for two reasons:
First, as mentioned, ISAs are heterogeneous. Some are
structured using intermediate entities, while others are peer-to-peer. 150
Some are pooled funds while others are not. 151 Some may attempt to
circumscribe the activities of the funding recipients while others may
not. 1 5 2 Furthermore, new variants are likely to develop. Given this
heterogeneity, enacting new regulatory schemes to govern ISAs at this
stage may be either over- or underinclusive and may miss some of the
issues that will arise, simply because we have not yet had enough
experience or time to determine the pitfalls, potential abuses,
alternative structures, and potential workarounds.
existing
resemble
ISAs
economically
many
Second,
arrangements that are already governed by established legal and
regulatory regimes. Analogizing each new ISA to familiar transactions
may suggest the types of rules and protections that should apply. There
is no reason not to benefit from regulatory insights and approaches
already developed for economically similar transactions.
Given the heterogeneity of ISAs and their resemblance to more
familiar arrangements, efficiency and equity considerations suggest
that if an ISA is economically comparable to another transaction, both
should receive similar treatment under the law. From an equity
perspective, if two transactions are economically identical, they should
be treated identically as an analytical starting point, and the

150. For example, Pave was designed to be a peer-to-peer financing arrangement. See supra
Part II.A.3. In contrast, Upstart interposed itself, or a related trust entity, between the investors
and the funding seeker. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 269 n.16.
151. See supra Part II.A.4.a (Lumni as an example of a structure using pooling); see also
Charles Luzar, Pave Has Crowdfunded Individuals... Now They Will Fund Groups, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2014, at 9:00 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/02/31292-pavecrowdfunded-individuals-now-want-fund-groups/ (Pave introducing the opportunity for Backers to
invest in a group of individuals to facilitate investor diversification).
152. For example, under the Fantex structure, the funding recipient is expected to remain
engaged in the specified sports-related activities for a minimum period of time (except in the case
of injury or other enumerated events). Fantex, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities
Act of 1933 (Form S-1) 6 (Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1573683/000104746913010747/a2217440zs-1.htm, archivedat http://perma.cclBXP6-R6EW. Both
Upstart and Pave emphasize how their funding structure constitutes an investment in the person
and not the activity. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 267; PAVE,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140106223438/http://www.pave.com/,
archived at http://perma.cc/
WK2Y-9DAK (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (describing the Pave agreement as an investment "in an
individual, not a project or company"). Under the Upstart contract, the funding recipient makes
payments based on a percentage of the income listed on Line 22 of the tax return, which is not
limited to any particular activity or line of business. Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 270.
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government should be prepared to explain any disparate treatment.1 5 3
From an efficiency perspective, treating two economically similar
transactions differently may create distortions and incentivize people
to enter into one over the other solely for regulatory reasons. 1 5 4
We do not argue that deviations from identical treatment should
never occur. In certain cases, it may be advisable to regulate a unique
industry or activity under special rules. However, this should be done
only after careful consideration and for sound policy reasons. 155 Because
ISAs are so new, the initial default should be comparable treatment
until good reasons can be articulated for doing something different. The
worry is that designing a new unified regulatory regime at the outset
might have the unintended effect of drawing numerous new lines
between like-kind transactions without a thorough understanding of
where the lines are and where the resulting distortions are likely to
be. 156 It is also possible that any new regulatory regime enacted at this
time may be less protective of funding recipients than existing
regulatory regimes might be. The better approach is regulation by
analogy on a case-by-case basis until the sector is more developed.
b. Possible Objections to the Case-by-CaseApproach
There are potential counterarguments to our suggested
approach. First, it might be argued that regulation by analogy itself
creates arbitrage by allowing parties to pick their desired regulatory
regime based on similarities to existing transactions.1 5 1 It may also
create arbitrage opportunities between fields, whereby transactions
could be structured to receive one label for purposes of field A and
another for purposes of field B. Yet, this is no different than the world
we currently inhabit. For example, parties willing to undertake the
economics of debt already receive debt treatment. Similarly, parties
have long been able to exploit arbitrage opportunities between fields.
153. See James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 139
(2012) (arguing that equity-horizontal and vertical-has no independent normative content, but
the concept plays a role in demanding that a government communicate its rationale for different
treatment).
154. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 16, at 1631 (observing that where a line is drawn,
"taxpayers will change their behavior to take advantage of the line. . . [creating] efficiency
effects.").
155. Id. at 1661-62 (urging a general approach of taxing close substitutes comparably).
156. See generally Strnad, supra note 16, at 571-72, 574 (critiquing an approach to taxing
new financial instruments that would apply a single regulatory regime to all new instruments, on
the grounds that "instruments with nearly identical cash flows may incur very different tax
liabilities.").
157. See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010)
(describing the "first comprehensive theory of regulatory arbitrage").
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Any reforms of this systemic reality should take place as part of a
broader conversation. 158
Second, it might be argued that the case-by-case approach
creates regulatory uncertainty that could stifle a burgeoning industry.
We offer two responses to this critique. We agree that the decision by
Upstart to suspend new ISA issuances and Pave's decision to emphasize
loans may be due in part to regulatory uncertainty. But we contend the
answer is not quick enactment of broad and inconsistent ISA
legislation. Reform efforts should not conflate regulatory certainty with
creation of a unified legal regime for ISAs. It is possible to generate
greater certainty while eschewing substantive uniformity by pursuing
regulation by analogy. This could be done, for example, by employing
carefully tailored prototype guidance issued by the relevant regulatory
authorities, which could act as narrowly crafted safe harbors. This is an
approach already utilized by regulators in various contexts. 159
Additionally, despite its tempting allure of certainty, substantive
uniformity in the treatment of ISAs does not necessarily guarantee
regulatory certainty in application. A unified approach would likely
cause problems due to the creation of unnecessary legal distinctions and
distortions. Furthermore, some uncertainty is not inherently bad. As
noted, ISAs, while promising, also contain pitfalls. A degree of
regulatory uncertainty may act as a friction against aggressive versions
of these transactions at the margins.1 60
Third, it is possible that in certain cases, regulation by analogy
may lead to the wrong result. Two transactions may be economically
similar, yet regulation by analogy may produce an illogical outcome. For
example, a transaction that is not the closest analogy for the ISA could,
in practice, serve as its closest substitute in the marketplace. In such
circumstances, it might be sensible to consider regulatory treatment
consistent with the closest substitute, rather than the closest analogy.
We do not contend that regulation by analogy will always reach the
right result. In cases where it does not, it may be appropriate to consider
deviating from the rule of choosing the most analogous transaction. But
158. For example, see the conversation regarding reforming the tax treatment of the cost of
capital and the distinction between debt and equity. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Fundamental Tax
Reform, 48 EMORY L. J. 809 (1999); David Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation
of Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397 (2004); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction
in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2000); Daniel Shaviro, Risk Based Rules and the
Taxation of Capital Income. 50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995); Graeme S. Cooper, Coordinating
Inconsistent Choices-The Problem of Hybrids (Dec. 14, 2014) (unpublished paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538276.
159. See RILEY, supra note 18.
160. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1312, 1331 (2001) (tax uncertainty may prevent a structure "from becoming pervasive").
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such deviation should be undertaken for clearly articulated reasons, in
circumscribed contexts. In general, regulating based on careful
analogies to existing rules and regimes remains the better course.
Finally, unified regulation might provide benefits that are
absent in our approach. For example, creation of a clear and unified
regulatory scheme may allow regulators to direct the development of
the young industry and to put a stamp of approval on "good"
transactions by protecting them. It may give rise to certainty, which can
facilitate development of the "good" parts of the industry. However,
these benefits should not be overstated.
Lawmakers and regulators have a long history of not
anticipating the variants that an industry can create. There are real
risks of being overinclusive in defining a "good transaction." These
tendencies might be exacerbated by the presence of interest groups and
the possibility of regulatory capture. 16 1 Many of those calling for a
unified regulatory regime strongly support ISAs and may not
appreciate (or may be understating) the downsides they present. Given
these realities, any unified scheme that is enacted would most likely be
overly broad. 162
Furthermore, regulatory certainty itself will not necessarily
ensure that desired transactions flourish. Recently proposed SEC
regulations sought to facilitate certain types of crowdfunding. However,
some commentators speculate that the new rules will be inadequate to
persuade market actors to pursue new offerings. 163 Successful
regulation requires understanding the actors, their concerns, and the
consequences of regulations, all of which depends on experience.
c. Concluding Thoughts on Regulation by Analogy
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that a case-by-case
approach that draws analogies to more familiar transactions is
161. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (noting a view that where "relevant decisionmakers operate
without any oversight, they tend to deliver benefits to well organized interest groups at the public's
expense"); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Eric Posner, Toward a Pigovian State, 164 U. PENN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (critiquing governments' propensity to use command and control
regulations rather than more efficient Pigovian taxes and noting the role of interest groups in the
design of regulation); Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation (Feb. 25, 2015)
(unpublished paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2570669
(considering how different regulatory techniques map onto different levels of delegation of decision
making to the state).
162. We are open to the possibility of a narrowly crafted safe harbor-for example, one that
protects peer-to-peer transactions of short duration and small income sharing percentage. Any
such safe harbor should be carefully designed to avoid the dangers we have discussed here.
163. See Shepro supra note 132.
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preferable to pursuing a unified framework for the new transactions at
this time.
We do not argue that regulators and lawmakers should stand
back and ignore ISAs, letting them grow unfettered. 164 Rather, we
recommend building on the rules and protections already developed
with respect to other arrangements, and borrowing from those concepts
in regulating the new transactions. This is a particularly reasonable
approach given the recent advances in consumer protections for
consumer financial products. 165 We are concerned that the creation of
new legal rules and regulations at this juncture is less likely to be welltailored and adequately protective of consumers and investors.16 6 While
there may be some benefits of a unified regime that are forgone by
choosing a case-by-case approach, these benefits are outweighed by the
merits.
B. The Analytical Extremes: Human Ownership? Or Debt?
Having argued for case-by-case regulation by analogy, the
remainder of Part III discusses the universe of arrangements to which
ISAs might be analogized. Part III.B examines two analytical extremes:
(1) the parallel between ISAs and slavery or servitude and (2) the idea
that ISAs are simply a form of contingent debt. Part III.C examines
other possible analogies.
1. Income Share Agreements as Slavery or Indentured Servitude
Even though ISAs obviously do not create direct property rights
in humans, the worry is that they might approximate such property
rights via financial contract. Upstart has been characterized in the
popular press as possibly being "a modern form of indentured

164. Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,65 U. CHI. L.REV. 1199,1201 (1998) (showing
why the claim that cyberspace cannot be effectively regulated by the government is flawed); Saule

T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Businessof Banking," 63
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1042 (2009) (arguing that Office of the Comptroller of the Currency decisions to
expand U.S. commercial banks' ability to engage in derivatives trading in a largely unregulated
environment contributed to the financial crisis in 2008).
165. See, for example, the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011
124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012)).
166. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians,89 N.C. L. REV.
1629, 1637 (2011) (contending that "regulatory capture [is] a more pronounced problem
for consumer protection" regulation); see also Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach:
FinancialRisk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267 (2012) (arguing that introducing
financial regulation in stages may be a better approach for managing risk and avoiding unintended
consequences).
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servitude."16 7 The Fantex transaction has been described as owning a
NFL athlete and as "creepy."16 8 Similar accounts can be found in a
variety of commentaries. 6 9 The offering startups themselves have also,
to varying degrees, characterized these instruments as resembling
human ownership. 170
These descriptions, if accurate, raise clear public policy and
regulatory concerns.1 7 1 If an arrangement too closely resembles
servitude or slavery, we already have legal and ethical frameworks for
thinking about it. For example, we might consider whether the
transaction should be subject to constitutional scrutiny, 72 whether it
167. Elliot Hannon, Is This Indentured Servitude or the New Venture Capital?, SLATE (Oct.
29, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/10/29/companies-look-to-loan
you-money-in returnfor-a.percentagesof-yourjfuture.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HTM7MRDY.
168. Matt Levine, Football Player Derivatives Are the Best Derivatives, BLOOMBERGVIEW
(Nov. 1, 2013, 4:13 PM) http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-11-01/football-playerderivatives-are-the-best-derivatives, archived at http://perma.cc/H3AR-FB23 ("The squick factor
); Jonathan Mahler, Want to
is obvious-you're buying a person! indentured servitude! etc ....
Buy Stock in an NFL Running Back?, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 29, 2013, 2:47 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-10-29/want-to-buy-stock-in-an-nfl-running-back-,
archived at http://perma.cc/5J7B-LRDP ("The first initial public offering for an athlete is under
way!").
169. See, e.g., Ken Previti, The American School for Indentured Servants, RECLAIM REFORM
(June
19,
2013),
http://reclaimreform.com/2013/06/19/the-american-school-for-indenturedservants/, archived at http://perma.cclT6R4-NQPY ("College age students are being legally
indentured"); Kevin Robertson, Owning a Player: Fantex and the Arian Foster IPO, THE SPORTS
LAW CANARY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://sportslawnews.wordpress.com/2013/11/23/owning-a-playerfantex-and-the-arian-foster-ipo/, archived at http://perma.cc/SVJ3-HC5J ("There is something
morally wrong for a society that has moved past slavery to then allow a person to become indebted
to another for life."); David von Ebers, Athletes for Sale, THIS WEEK IN BLACKNESS (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://thisweekinblackness.com/david-von-ebers/athletes-for-sale/, archived at http://perma.cc/
ST2P-UFZY (noting that "[t]he very idea of 'owning' a piece of an athlete is unsettling" and that
"the concept evokes images of slavery, albeit highly paid slavery"); see also Oei & Ring, supranote
3, at 267 nn.3-7 (providing further examples). But see Mark O'Neill, Upstart:Backers Invest in
You, and Your Future Earnings Repay Them, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://smallbiztrends.com/2014/02/upstart-backers-invest-future-student-earnings.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/8DP5-8WYG (calling criticism of Upstart "harsh" because the program gives a
person the "start he or she needs" and "[limits] backers in the amount they get in return"); James
Surowiecki,
The
New
Futurism, THE
NEW
YORKER,
Nov.
4,
2013,
http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/04/the-new-futurism, archived at http://perma.cc/D9EMQW8E (noting that although some people describe this funding as "indentured servitude.... the
analogy is flawed").
170. See Fund Your Future, UPSTART, http://web.archive.org/web/20140419222848/zzhttps://
www.upstart.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/K7HR-5RE4 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) ("By
borrowing from their future selves, upstarts can make the best decisions for their lives today.").
Another Upstart ad characterized ISAs as transactions in which "people invest in people." Upstart
Ad on BoSTON.COM (Apr. 22, 2014) (on file with the authors); see also How It Works, PAVE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140327134603/http://www.pave.com/how-it-works,
archived at
http://perma.cc/HF6L-82YB (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) ("Talent is an asset").
171. See Oei & Ring, supranote 3, at 272-73 (discussing some of these concerns).
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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might violate the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867,173 whether it might
violate treaty obligations,174 or whether it should otherwise be banned
on public policy grounds.17 5

The involuntary servitude/slavery characterization may seem
inapt because there are clear differences between ISAs and slavery or
indentured servitude as commonly understood.17 6 ISAs do not actually
make a person someone else's property. They do not force funding
recipients to work for funding providers.1 7 7 Work done is compensated,
and there are often no formal restrictions on choice of work.1 7 8
On the other hand, the analogy is not entirely unfounded.179
First, the comparison should not be taken literally. Commentators are
obviously not suggesting that ISAs are identical to slave or indentured
servant relationships, as those terms have been understood in our
cultural context. Rather, the significant point is that ISAs trigger
reflexive comparisons to slavery or servitude for some observers. The
real question is, what is it about these transactions and the rights they
convey that generates this response?
For example, the possibility of an investor capturing an overly
large return, or taking too large a percentage, may elicit a reaction that

173. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012).
174. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery § I, art. 1, April 30, 1957, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
treaties.un.org/doclPublication/UNTS/Volume%20266/v266.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/
LF&J-FQ8N.
175. Such public policy restrictions would not be unprecedented. See, e.g., National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301, 98 Stat. 2339, 2346 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e) (making it illegal to "transfer any human organ for valuable consideration"); see also
Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739 (2010) (discussing legal regulation
and constraints on markets for various "taboo transactions").
176. See Kyle Chayka, Investing in Human Capital,Literally, PAC. STANDARD, Mar. 26, 2014,
http://www.psmag.com/navigation/business-economics/investing-human-capital-literally-77448/,
archived at http://perma.cc/9PTP-8RYC ("Crowd-investing ... actually seems more like a guild or
apprenticeship system."); O'Neill, supra note 169 (if these transactions "give[] the person the start
he or she needs, and backers are limited in the amount they get in return, calling it indentured
servitude seems like harsh criticism").
177. Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1911). In that case, Bailey obtained $15
from a corporation in exchange for agreeing to work for a year at $12 a month, $1.25 of which
would go to the corporation. An Alabama law treating failure to perform without just cause as
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud violated the Thirteenth Amendment.
178. But see Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25 (stating that if Davis "retires from the
NFL . . . within two years following [the stock] offering, other than as a result of injury, illness or
medical condition, [Fantex] . . . may elect in our sole discretion to terminate the brand contract"
and Davis must repay the funded amount net of amounts already repaid).
179. See WILLIAM C. RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL, AND
REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE (2007).
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there is excessive control over another human.18 0 The fact that some
ISAs involve market-based, commodifying valuations of the recipient's
human capital may accentuate their property and ownership-like
aspects. 181 If the investor's interest in the future income stream is
tradable, this may also emphasize the ownership-like aspects, as may
the race-based dimensions of some ISAs. 182 The presence of minimum
payment amounts, minimum work periods, or default clauses may also
suggest servitude.1 8 3
Second and relatedly, slavery and servitude are themselves
distinct and multifaceted institutions. 18 4 While slavery in the United
States generally involved a property interest in the enslaved person,
indentured servitude was a kind of debt bondage. In exchange for a
benefit (e.g., free passage), the indentured servant was required to work
for a number of years to pay off his indenture.18 5 Both institutions have
also varied depending on geographical and historical context. For
example, historians have identified differences in U.S. slavery
depending on time period (eighteenth vs. nineteenth century),
geography (north vs. south), and gender and age of those enslaved. 86 A
full discussion of slavery and indentured servitude-particularly as
180. Such concerns may also underlie characterization of industrial worker working
conditions as "wage slavery." See, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 60-97 (1998); Lea S.

Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 474 (1989)
(discussing the "wage slavery" debate in the labor movement).
181. The question of what types of market transfers should be allowed is the subject of a
robust literature on commodification. See generally MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAw & CULTURE (2005); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (2001); Krawiec, supra note 175 (discussing "taboo

transactions"); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849-52
(1987) (developing a "human flourishing" theory of "market inalienability").
182. See sources cited supra note 181; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY:
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Anthony Paul Farley, The Black
Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 458-61 (1997).

183. See Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25.
184. See sources cited infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text; see also GUNTHER PECK,
REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST,

1880-1930, at 82-112 (2000).
185. Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century
Pennsylvania, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 85 (1991); Sharon V. Salinger, Labor, Markets, and
Opportunity: Indentured Servitude in Early America, 38 LAB. HIST. 311, 314 (1997); see also
sources cited infra note 186.
186. See STACEY K. CLOSE, ELDERLY SLAVES OF THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1997); ELIZABETH
Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD 146-192 (1988) (discussing lives of elderly
slaves); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH
(1999); WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2d
ed. 2011); JOHN BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM

SOUTH 149-190, 223-322 (1979) (discussing stereotypes, institutional roles, and the family in
slavery).
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understood by popular commentators-is beyond the scope of this
Article. The key point is that the analogy between ISAs and slavery or
servitude should not be cursorily dismissed. ISAs do create some degree
of impingement on one's right to reap the fruits of one's own human
capital. The relevant question is whether a given ISA so impinges on
this right as to replicate or approximate some servitude or slavery-like
characteristics in a modern-day financial transaction.
Third, while ISAs would probably not run afoul of the Thirteenth
Amendment under current court interpretations, the analysis cannot
stop there. Although the Thirteenth Amendment has been narrowly
construed and is unlikely to implicate financing transactions,1 8 7 various
scholars have advocated a broader jurisprudence. 188 Furthermore, even
if a transaction is not unconstitutional, lawmakers may decide to
restrict or prohibit it on public policy grounds. This has been done with
transactions considered unacceptably commodifying or exploitative,
such as sales of certain body parts.1 89 ISAs share some of these
commodification concerns.
The deeper question, then, is whether ISAs contractually
approximate servitude, slavery, or some other type of commodifying or
exploitative relationship as a result of the underlying rights and
relationships they create. Because different agreements parcel out

187. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 931 (1988) ("[The term 'involuntary
servitude' necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of
coercion through law or the legal process."). But see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944)
(explaining a Florida statute creating a presumption of fraud from nonperformance of contract for
labor violated the Thirteenth Amendment and Anti-Peonage Act).
188. Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Problems in the 2005
Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 27-36 (2008) (examining possibility that
involuntary Chapter 11 plans may violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Karen Gross, The Debtor
as Modern Day Peon:A Problem of UnconstitutionalConditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 169
(1990) (suggesting that a debtor "has sufficient aspects in common with a peon" to implicated the
Thirteenth Amendment); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the
ConstitutionalLaw of "InvoluntaryServitude," 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1502-15 (2010) (articulating a
standard for evaluating labor claims under the Involuntary Servitude Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
189. See sources cited supra notes 175 and 181 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., G.S.
Becker & J.J. Elias, IntroducingIncentives in the Market for Live and CadavericOrgan Donations,
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9 (2007) (noting that the current legislation prohibits payments for organs);
S. Leider & A.E. Roth, Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?, 10 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION
1221, 1221 (2010) (discussing the National Organ Transplant Act and "repugnance" toward selling
kidneys); Erik Malmqvist, Are Bans on Kidney Sales Unjustifiably Paternalistic?,28 BIOETHICS
110, 114-17 (2014) (listing arguments for and against legislation concerning the sale of kidneys);
A.J. Matas, The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections and Concerns, 4 AM. J.
TRANSPLANT 2007, 2009-13 (2004) (discussing a myriad of concerns including "exploitation of the
poor" and "commodification of the body"); Julian Savulescu, Is the Sale of Body Parts Wrong? 29 J.
MED. ETHICS 138, 138-39 (2003) (noting that selling organs may force the poor into the market).
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different rights, one cannot conclude whether a given ISA approximates
servitude or slavery without a case-by-case analysis. We propose a
multifactor framework for doing such analysis in Part IV.
2. Income Share Agreements as Debt
At the other end of the analytical spectrum, ISAs might be
regarded as simply a form of contingent debt. Both debt and ISAs
involve a transfer of funds up front in return for payments under a
contract. Upstart itself initially characterized its arrangement as
essentially a loan in its transaction documents. 190 Debt characterization
typically leads to the normative conclusion that, despite their
distinctive marketing, ISAs are not special. The corresponding
regulatory conclusion is that, because debt is a familiar form of
individual financing that falls under well-developed regulatory
regimes, few or no new regulatory structures are needed to govern ISAs.
There are clear similarities between ISAs and debt, and some
ISAs may look so much like debt that they are economically
indistinguishable. The fact that ISAs are income contingent might not
prevent a debt designation. Individuals have long entered into lending
transactions in which interest rates vary based on market interest rates
or other benchmarks. 19 1 Depending on other investor protections, an
ISA with repayment contingent on future earnings could be viewed as
just another type of variable rate debt. 192
Debt characterization may be buttressed in cases where the
funding provider receives robust protections from downside risk, for
example, through deferral clauses that extend the repayment term in
years where the funding recipient's income is too low. The return on
investment may also appear more fixed and debt-like in the case of
agreements that cap the upside return, although high upsides can be
found in some payday-lending arrangements as well and do not
preclude debt characterization. 1 93 As discussed in Part II, some
190. See Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 273-74 (describing Upstart's shifting characterization).
191. For example, interest rates linked to LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate), or Bond
Buyer's 20 bond index (used to establish cost of municipal, tax-free debt). See Bond Buyer's 20
Bond Index, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/bond-buyer-20-bondindex.aspx, archived at http://perma.cclKDF3-249M (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); LIBOR, Other
Interest Rate Indexes, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rateslibor.aspx,
archived at, http://perma.cclN3QW-8USK (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
192. Surowiecki, supra note 169 ("[A]t root, a human-capital contract is what's called an
income-contingent loan: how much you pay back depends on how much you earn."). But see I.R.C.
§ 351(g) (2012) (borderline instruments receive equity treatment).
193. See, e.g., Alex Kaufman, Payday Lending Regulation 1-7 (Finance and Econ. Discussion
Series, Div. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No.
2013-62, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201362/201362pap.pdf,
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transactions do place floors and ceilings on the repayment obligations
of the funding recipients, and future variants could certainly move
further in this direction. 194
However, the debt analogy may not sufficiently capture the full
complexity of the new ISAs. There is arguably a distinction between
debt instruments that vary based on a market interest rate or other
benchmark and an instrument that varies based on a person's future
earnings. 195 The latter may look more like an ownership interest in
human capital than the former, and debt characterization may not
capture this nuance. Furthermore, in most ISAs there is no formal
obligation to repay the principal amount, even if there are informal
pressures, which means additional risk for the funding provider. 196
Thus, like the servitude or slavery analogy, whether an ISA can
be classified or analogized as debt will depend on the economics of the
individual transaction. Of course, just because a transaction looks like
debt does not mean it is unproblematic. If anything, comparing and
analogizing to more traditional forms of lending illuminates the risks
and potential problems with both ISAs and traditional debt. Our point
is simply that if an ISA is closely analogous to debt, we should consider
borrowing from existing normative and regulatory approaches that
apply to traditional debt in designing that ISA's legal treatment.
C. The Equity-Like Gray Zone
Apart from slavery/servitude and debt characterization, ISAs
may also be analogized to other arrangements that are not debt but do
not rise to the level of human ownership. Broadly speaking, there are
three basic categories of such "gray-zone" analogies: (1) corporate
equity, (2) partnership or joint venture, and (3) a residual category of
other arrangements that look like equity but may be something else.

archived at http://perma.cc/LX32-LKQE (reviewing policy issues surrounding payday lending);
Rachel Swan, San FranciscoStart-Up Drafts 49er Vernon Davis for IPORoster S.F. WEEKLY: THE
SNITCH BLOG (Oct. 31, 2013,
1:38 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitchl2013/10
/vernondavis fantex.php, archived at http://perma.cc/JC3Y-JCJU (noting that athletes may not
necessarily come out ahead in these deals).
194. For example, Upstart's transaction capped repayments at three times the amount
funded. See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28 and accompanying text. Pave's has an
effective cap of five times the amount funded. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
195. But see I.RC. § 351(g) (nonqualified preferred stock not treated as stock).
196. Note that some agreements have deferral clauses and minimum employment clauses
meant to mitigate investor risk. See sources cited supra notes 31, 32, and 46 and accompanying
text; see also Fantex, Inc., supranote 1, at 6 (two-year minimum period of NFL activity).
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1. The Corporate Equity Analogy
A frequently heard claim is that ISAs resemble corporate equity,
a de facto incorporation of humans.19 7 News articles and blog posts
proclaim that "[n]ew crowdfunding platforms let you sell stock in
yourself' and speak of "how normal people are becoming
corporations."1 9 8 Equity characterization of ISAs can also be found in
the academic literature: Friedman and Kuznets characterized human
capital contracts as sales of stock in humans, and other scholars have
noted this characterization as well. 199 Just as commentators raising
slavery and servitude concerns likely do not mean that ISAs literally
replicate historical slavery, those who make a corporate analogy
understand that humans have not actually been incorporated. 0 0
Rather, the imagery of incorporating a human captures an overall sense
that an ISA may allocate, via financial contract, ownership claims in a
human in a manner reminiscent of how stock divides up ownership of a
"corporate" person.
More precisely, the corporate equity analogy draws a parallel to
corporate finance, in which businesses raise capital by either borrowing
(i.e., debt financing) or by issuing shares in exchange for a capital
contribution (i.e., equity financing). Despite their common purpose,
debt and equity are treated differently under the law. Equity suggests
ownership of the enterprise as opposed to a mere creditor relationship.
An equity owner generally is understood to have not only an interest in
the upside of business performance but also greater exposure to the
downside of business failure. 201 Debt holders have rights to get repaid

197. See, e.g., KOLLIN & KOLLIN, supra note 11; Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2:593:59).
198. Adrianne Jeffries, New CrowdfundingPlatforms Let You Sell Stock in Yourself (Feb. 26,
2013, at 2:30 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/26/4031938/new-crowdfunding-platforms-letyou-sell-stock-in-yourself, archived at http://perma.cc/7XYJ-CMQF; Kevin Roose, The IPO of You
and Me: How Normal People are Becoming Corporations,THE VERGE (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:05 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/11/ipo-of-you-and-me.html,
archived
at
http://
perma.cc/SJ28-Y7U4 ("What do Twitter, Berkshire Hathaway, and your best friend Dave have in
common? Pretty soon, you might be able to buy stock in all three."); see Alison Griswold, Because
10, 2014,
2:28 PM) http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
You're Worth It (Apr.
moneybox/2014/04/income-share -agreements insteadof.taking-out-loans students sell stock.
html, archived at http://perma.ccl3U7L-DFAY ("Afraid of student loan debt? Sell stock in yourself
instead.").
199. Friedman & Kuznets, supra note 10; Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 86, at 2-4;
Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2:59-3:59).
200. See sources cited supra note 199.
201. See, e.g., Comm'r v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935):
The shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and
profits from success. The creditor, in compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be
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irrespective of how the business is performing while equity owners do
not. 202
Within the corporate equity rubric, it is possible to refine our
thinking further. Extending the analogy, a human could be
characterized as issuing (1) an equity-like stake akin to certain types of
preferred shares (i.e., generally, seniority in repayment and a
prenegotiated dividend amount, but no voting or control rights) in her
entire self, or (2) an equity-like preferred stake in a specific enterprise
that she has undertaken. The first construction most closely captures
the view that the new transactions approximate the incorporation of
humans, as opposed to the de facto interposition of a corporate entity
between the individual and the enterprise she is conducting.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the corporate equity analogy may
not be satisfactory in some cases. First, the economics of the transaction
might not suggest equity characterization. Some interests may be so
protected from risk that they are effectively debt, not equity. 203 Second,
corporate dividends are not necessarily guaranteed. By contrast, in the
ISA context, the income share must be paid to the funding provider.
Third, other indicia of corporate equity may be absent, such as voting
rights, low bankruptcy priority compared to debt, or limited liability.
Finally, there may be no actual entity interposed between the investor
and the funding recipient.
Ultimately, the corporate equity analogy may make the most
sense in cases where (1) funds have been raised to support the funding

paid independently of the risk of success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when
the payment date arrives.
See also Crawford Drug Stores, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 292, 295-96 (10th Cir. 1955) ("[I]t
is a common attribute of a debt that the holder thereof is entitled to interest thereon even though
there are no net earnings. But in ordinary circumstances the holder of preferred stock has no such
absolute right to the payment of dividends."); I.R.S. Chief Counsel Adv. Mem., CCA 200134004,
2001 WL 961299 (Aug. 24, 2001) ("One general difference between equity and debt is that an equity
holder's profit or loss depends on the success of the business venture, whereas a debt holder is
entitled to his return without regard to the success of the business."); JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, JCX-41-11,

PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND

RELATING TO TAx TREATMENT

OF

BUSINESS
DEBT
15
(July
11,
2011),
available
at
https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=showdown&id=3803, archived at https://perma.cc/9WK3-M7GY.
202. There are other legal consequences associated with holding debt as opposed to equity; a
corporation generally owes fiduciary duties to shareholders not owed to bondholders except in
cases of fraud, insolvency, or illegality. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302-03 (Del. 1988).
Debtholders enter into different covenants than shareholders. Holders of debt, even convertible
debt, also generally do not have rights to bring a derivative action. Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d
215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(convertible subordinated debenture holders had standing to sue in a derivative action); cf. N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (noting that in
Delaware, debtholder had rights to bring derivative action where corporation was insolvent).
203. See sources cited supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
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recipient's business venture, as opposed to, say, the funding recipient's
education; and/or (2) an intermediate entity actually plays a key role in
the arrangement.
2. The Partnership Interest/Joint Venture Analogy
ISAs may also be analogized to joint ventures or partnerships.
The difference between the partnership/joint venture analogy and the
corporate equity analogy is that the former does not attempt to
interpose a corporate entity or posit de facto incorporation of the
human. In a partnership or joint venture, the parties associate to carry
out a business enterprise for profit, combining their skill, knowledge,
money, and/or property to that end. 2 04 While joint ventures and

partnerships are not completely synonymous, they are overlapping
categories without a clear distinction. 205 Joint ventures are usually
more limited than partnerships in scope, purpose, and duration. 206 Yet,
partnership law usually governs joint ventures. 207
The partnership/joint venture analogy leads to various legal and
regulatory insights. In tax law, for example, a finding that an
arrangement is in substance a partnership for tax purposes generally
leads to a pass-through taxation regime with complex rules. 208 In
corporate law, while a corporation provides limited liability for the
owners of the corporation, a common law general partnership will not
204. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949):
[A Partnership exists when] considering all the facts-the agreement, the conduct of
the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of
disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and
capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used,
and any other facts throwing light on their true intent-the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intend to join together in the present conduct of the
enterprise.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2014); 106 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3D 351 § 1 (2009) (describing partnership as "a combination of two or more persons of their
property, effects, labor, or skill in a common business or venture, under an agreement to share the
profits or losses in equal or specified proportions").
205. Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 694, 697
(Ark. 1990) (stating that a joint venture must have elements of partnership); Weiner v.
Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1991) ('The distinction between joint ventures and
partnerships is not sharply drawn."); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 5; 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures
§ 3 ("The divergence between the two relations is still very slight and is difficult to ascertain in
some circumstances.").
206. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 5 ("[T]he principal difference between a partnership and
a joint venture is that a partnership is ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general business,
while a joint venture is usually limited to a single transaction.").
207. 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 3.
208. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing characterization as a partnership and the resulting tax
implications).
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necessarily provide comparable protection for its partners.2 09 In
addition, the partnership/joint venture analogy may hold different
nuances as a policymaking heuristic than the corporate analogy.
Corporate equity connotes ownership and control, while a partnership
analogy may tend to suggest a more cooperative advancement of a
shared goal between the capital-providing partner and the services
partner. Thus, analogizing to a partnership/joint venture relationship
may lead to a more sanguine evaluation of ISAs.
Yet, the partnership/joint venture analogy also poses conceptual
challenges. As with the corporate equity analogy, it is unclear whether
the underlying asset or enterprise is a circumscribed activity or the
funding recipient herself. Two distinct variants are possible: (1) a
partnership or joint venture arrangement between capital-providing
partners and the funding recipient (as primarily a services partner) in
the venture of her "life," or (2) a partnership or joint venture
arrangement between capital-providing partners and the funding
recipient (as primarily a services partner), in which the venture is a
circumscribed set of activities (e.g., football activities or a specific
business venture). The first variant stretches our notion of partnership
to a greater extent than the second. 210
Notably, the element of joint enterprise may be missing in some
ISAs. For example, the funding providers may not be able to force the
funding recipients to pursue certain careers or activities. 211 Under
common law, both partnership and joint venture arrangements
generally feature an element of joint control. 2 12 On the other hand, in
limited partnerships, some limited partners may not necessarily
exercise control over the business. 2 13 In sum, despite conceptual

209. The increase in available entity options, including LLCs, LLPs, and LPs, along with
electivity of pass-through tax treatment, has diminished some of these differences. See, e.g.,
Heather M. Field, Checking in on "Check-the-Box," 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 524 (2009); Susan
Pace Hamill, The OriginsBehind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1519-21
(1998).
210. This is especially so because "traditional" partnerships would be treated as separate
entities for some purposes, for example, when entering into contracts with other parties. The first
variant makes it more difficulty to identify the "entity" in the ISA parallel.
211. But see Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25.
212. A joint venture generally requires (1) an agreement to carry on the enterprise for profit;
(2) evidence of an intent to be joint venturers; (3) contribution by each venturer of property, money,
skill, or effort; (4) some joint control over the venture; and (5) provision for sharing of profits and
losses. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 8 (2014). A partnership generally requires (1) the intent to
be partners; (2) coownership of the business (including control over the business and profit and
loss sharing); and (3) a profit motive. 106 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 351 § 8 (2009).
213. See generally Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the
Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited PartnerEstoppel Liability
as Well as Full General PartnerLiability?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667 (2004) (describing history of
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challenges (such as the lack of a separate legal entity), it is conceivable
that the partnership/joint venture analogy may turn out to be the
closest analogy for at least some ISAs, particularly ones that are strictly
peer-to-peer, more informal, and more interactive.
3. "Equity in Disguise" (i.e., Nonequity)
Finally, ISAs resemble some arrangements that are not really
equity at all. The following are some of the key possibilities. 2 14
a. Insurance
Some ISAs may resemble insurance or risk-pooling
arrangements, which are traditionally entered into to smooth
consumption or earnings shocks. Insurance is, broadly speaking, the
transfer of risk from an insured to the insurer in exchange for a price
or premium. 215 Many types of risks may be insured against, and a
variety of arrangements may be characterized as insurance. For
example, consumer bankruptcy is commonly characterized as a form of
social insurance against economic distress. 216 Procedures for requesting
forbearance from tax collection may also be characterized as a form of
social insurance. 217 Insurance arrangements usually contain the
elements of risk diversification and risk pooling: the insurer diversifies
against the risk assumed by aggregating the risks of many into an
actuarially sound insurance pool. 21 8 The dual asymmetric information
limited partner control rule and its elimination under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of
2001, § 303).
214. In addition to the categories we describe, ISAs may also be reminiscent of other
arrangements we have not discussed, such as apprenticeship arrangements, syndicates, contracts
for services, and sales of body parts. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN F. HAMILTON, APPRENTICESHIP
FOR ADULTHOOD: PREPARING YOUTH FOR THE FUTURE 153-86 (1990) (arguing for an "American-

Style Apprenticeship System").
215. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance

§§

1-3 (defining the characteristics of insurance); ALLAN

HERBERT WILLETT, THE EcoNOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 71-73 (1951).

216. Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 131 (2005) (noting "the general agreement that consumer
bankruptcy functions at least partly as a form of social insurance"); Richard M. Hynes, Why
(Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 153 (2004) (consumer bankruptcy "provides the
consumer with a form of insurance that the consumer failed to purchase due to some form of
market failure"). Under this conception, the pool of insureds is everyone eligible to file for
consumer bankruptcy, the insurance premium is extracted by imposition of higher interest rates,
and the payout comes in the form of debt forgiveness.
217. See Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insuranceand the Forgiveness
of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 462-70 (2012).
218. WILLETT, supranote 215, at 72 ("Wherever there is accumulation for uncertain losses, or
wherever there is a transfer of risk, there is one element of insurance; only where these are joined
with the combination of risks in a group is the insurance complete").
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concerns of adverse selection (the worry that only risky people will
purchase insurance) and moral hazard (the worry that insureds will
behave badly because they feel protected against risk) are features of
most insurance schemes. 219
In addition to drawing parallels to equity, the financial press has
characterized Fantex as insurance for the athlete against future injury
or disability. The insurance payout comes in the form of a guaranteed
sum up front, and the premiums are calculated as a percentage of future
NFL earnings. 220 Such insurance characterization is buttressed by the
fact that the amount of insurance "purchased" seems to vary based on
the riskiness of the position played. 221 The Fantex transaction exhibits
the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard common to
insurance transactions-specifically, that (1) only risky football players
would do the deal, and (2) the athletes might behave badly (e.g., by
taking excessive risks on the field, accepting less pay, or quitting)
because they feel protected against risk.
Other ISAs may also approximate insurance. Students and
entrepreneurs may, for example, use ISAs to protect themselves against
the risk of career failure, the risk that a decision to pursue education
does not reap the expected returns, or the risk that a bankruptcy filing
will result in a nondischargeable student loan debt. 222 Moral hazard
and adverse selection issues will also be present in these contexts.
Framing these arrangements as insurance may cast them in a
more positive light than analogizing them to equity. However, the
insurance analogy also has limits. Depending on the transaction's

219. See generally Ronen Avraham, The Economics of InsuranceLaw-A Primer, 19 CONN.
INS. L.J. 29, 34, 42-45 (2012) (discussing the informational concerns and moral hazards).
220. See supranote 142. The transaction does contain a claw-back provision. See, e.g., Fantex,
Inc., supranote 1, at 165.
221. For example, among the initial deals pursued by Fantex was an offering on Arian Foster,
a Houston Texans running back. Foster opted to monetize twenty percent of his future earnings.
See Erik Matuszewski, Fantex Postpones Arian Foster Share Sale Because of Back Surgery (Nov.
13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/2013-11-12/fantex-postpones-arian-fostershare-sale-because-of-back-surgery, archived at http://perma.cc/2ZG7-MPRJ. In contrast, Vernon
Davis, a San Francisco 49ers tight end, opted to monetize only ten percent. Explore Stocks, supra
note 22. According to NFL-based statistics, the running back position is physically more risky than
that of tight end. Matt Stiles, Charting NFL Injuries, THE DAILY VIZ (March 17, 2013),
http://thedailyviz.com/2013/03/17/charting-nfl-injuries/, archived at http://perma.cc/V6J4-KH3A.
Foster's offering was ultimately suspended due to back surgery. See Matuszewski, supra.Although
riskiness of player position may have been an initial factor in selecting monetization rates, the
current offerings (covering players in several different positions) are all at ten percent, with the
exception of wide receiver Alshon Jeffery at thirteen percent. See Explore Stocks, supra note 22.
222. Students may be managing risk by entering into these agreements in order to convert
nondischargeable student loan debt into a debt that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8)(A) (2012) (excepting student loans from discharge provisions).
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economics, it is possible that risk transfer has not actually occurred. 223
Also, the consumption-smoothing aspect of insurance arguably is more
questionable with ISAs because the insurance payout comes up front,
before the risks being insured against have materialized. 2 2 4 Perhaps
most importantly, while ISAs may change the allocation of risks,
current ISA structures do not generally pool risk. 2 2 5 For example, risk
is being transferred to the purchasers of Fantex shares, but such
shareholders may not be diversifying their risks by investing in many

athletes.226
However, there is nothing to stop investors from pooling risk, for
example, by purchasing other types of investments. Furthermore, to the
extent that funding is not sought to develop a commercial enterprise
but rather to smooth shocks, the arrangement may be credibly
described as insurance-like.
Thus, whether the insurance analogy is apt will depend on the
economics-particularly the risk diversification and pooling featuresof the specific transaction. If an ISA can be fairly characterized as
insurance, this may suggest a certain set of regulatory consequences,
such as being subject to the jurisdiction of insurance regulators.
b. Sale of an Income-GeneratingAsset or Income Stream
ISAs may also be likened to a sale of an income-generating asset
or rights to future income, such as an account receivable, an intangible,
or some other type of future income stream. An individual might do this
to accelerate cash receipts. For example, a funding seeker who is
reasonably certain he will receive $50,000 a year of royalties for the
next two years but who needs immediate payment might be able to
accelerate that income stream at a suitable discount rate in exchange
for a current lump sum. 2 2 7 The analogy to sales of a receivable or right
to future income may be most apt when the time period for income
sharing is not very long or where the source and amount of the
repayments is quite certain.
If an ISA were analogized to such a sale or an assignment of
income, then the regulatory consequences might differ from that
accorded to an equity-like or debt-like arrangement. For example, the

223.
224.
sports or
225.
226.
227.

For example, insurance may simply not have occurred to the funding recipients.
In Fantex, the athletes receive their funds upfront and regardless of actual injury or
commercial success. See supra Part II.A.1.
See WILLETT, supra note 215, at 72.
See supra Part II.A.1.
This is essentially the nature of the Bowie Bond transaction. See supra Part II.B.3.
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asset sold might escape inclusion in a bankruptcy estate. 228 The tax
consequences of a sale would also be different from that accorded an
equity or debt issuance. 229
c. Gift, Donation, and Subsidy
Finally, while some ISAs are designed to ensure that investors
earn a certain return, others may be designed with a less profit-oriented
motivation. For example, transactions offered by nonprofits or the
government may be designed with the understanding that the funding
provider may not necessarily recover its full investment or may recover
no more than its principal. 230 Such transactions may look less like
equity or a sale and more like a gift, subsidy, or charitable donation.
Particularly with respect to government-backed arrangements but also
potentially with some nonprofit transactions, ISAs may be a form of
social redistribution. It is likely that we will regard transactions that
look like gifts, donations, or subsidies differently from those in which
investors earn a profit, both in terms of normative evaluation and legal
treatment.

The challenge confronting us is how to determine our normative
attitudes and regulatory approach towards ISAs. In Part III, we argued
that the work of comparison and analogy can help accomplish both
tasks. First, comparing and analogizing ISAs to more familiar
arrangements can serve as a heuristic for normative evaluation.
Second, the predominant characteristics of a given ISA and its
comparability to familiar regulatory categories should suggest the
appropriate approach to its regulation. 231 In general, an ISA should be
regulated similarly to the existing category to which it is most
analogous, unless there is a good reason to deviate. This allows
economically similar transactions, particularly those that are close

228. See, e.g., Thomas J. Gordon, Securitizationof Executory Future Flows as BankruptcyRemote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000) (describing how to keep a securitized asset
out of a bankruptcy estate by structuring it as a true sale).
229. Compare I.R.C. § 1001 (2012) (defining gain and loss for sales), and § 1221 (defining
capital assets to exclude stock in trade of the taxpayer), with § 351 (recognizing no gain or loss if
property is transferred in exchange for stock). For example, such a sale might implicate the
assignment of income doctrine.
230. This is arguably the case with 13th Avenue Funding and Lumni's nonprofit funds. See
supra Parts II.A.4.a and II.A.4.b.
231. See supraPart III.B and C.
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substitutes, to be treated similarly. 232 Conversely, a wholesale approach
that groups all ISAs together and regulates them in a monolithic
fashion is likely to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or poorly tailored.

IV. A MULTIFACTOR FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION
How might regulators determine the categories to which ISAs
are most analogous? Part IV articulates a multifactor framework that
may be employed across a number of regulatory fields in making this
determination. Multifactor tests are a well-established regulatory tool
in a number of fields. A multifactor analysis may be applied in cases
where regulators are seeking to determine how a new transaction
should be categorized and labeled for purposes of regulating the
activity. In particular, this method can play an important role where
transactions or contractual arrangements have features of more than
one analytical or regulatory category. 233 A multifactor analysis tailored
to address the distinctive issues raised by these transactions is a
particularly appropriate mode of analysis in the case of ISAs because it
is sensitive to the heterogeneity of ISAs and the various regulatory
fields that may potentially govern them.
A. Should a TransactionBe Treated as Debt?
The first step is to determine whether a seemingly new
transaction is actually new or whether it is simply a type of contingent
debt. It makes sense to ask this threshold question because debt is a
familiar regulatory construct with respect to the financing of
individuals. The question is whether an ISA has enough in common
with debt that it can fit snugly in the debt "box" and be regulated

accordingly.
Weighing a list of factors can help make this determination. In
the ISA context, the following factors would suggest that an
arrangement is similar enough to debt that we should strongly consider
regulating it as such. It is important to reiterate that there is no
expectation that precisely the same list of factors would be applied in
all regulatory fields to test the ISA's similarity to debt. However, given

232. See supra Part III.A.2.
233. For example, a multifactor analysis is used to distinguish debt from equity in the tax and
bankruptcy contexts. E.g., Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 444 F.3d 771, 776-77 (6th Cir. 2006); Fin
Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) (citing J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v.
Comm'r, 387 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1967)); Idaho Dev., LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 272 P.3d
373, 377-78 (Idaho 2011). The list of factors differs among courts, and courts have generally
recognized that no single factor is determinative.

730

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:681

that debt instruments have certain core features irrespective of the
regulatory field doing the analysis, we anticipate that the following
factors would be relevant in multiple fields:
Intent of the parties. The parties' intent, as manifested
by objective factors such as the funding provider's
expectation of repayment, the instrument label, the
financial viability of the funding recipient, and the
recipient's likely ability to repay principal plus interest,
should be considered.
Form of the instrument. For example, the existence of a
fixed term, an unconditional promise to pay, and
remedies upon default would indicate a debt instrument.
Whether the interest rate is fixed. A fixed interest rate
would tend to indicate debt.
Duration of the instrument and existence of a fixed
maturity date. A fixed maturity date is indicative of debt,
and a longer duration is indicative of equity because the
holder takes on more risk over a longer time period.
Extent of subordination to claims of creditors.
Subordination to other debts in repayment priority
indicates an equity interest.
Allocation of the risk between parties. To the extent the
funding provider is insulated against the risk of low
earnings or loss of principal-for example, by virtue of
minimum payments, earnings floors, or term deferralsthe agreement looks more like debt, in which repayment
of principal is required.234
Participation in management. A greater degree of
participation in management suggests an equity or
ownership investment, rather than a mere creditor
interest.
234. See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir.
2006) ("[T]he Dutch banks' interest was overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender's
interest, which would neither be harmed by poor performance of the partnership nor significantly
enhanced by extraordinary profits. The banks had no meaningful stake in the success or failure of
Castle Harbour.").
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If a weighing of these and other relevant factors by a regulatory regime
suggests that a given ISA sufficiently resembles debt to be treated as
such, then the existing legal framework in that field for regulating debt
can be applied to the ISA.
This is not to say that ISAs may not raise fresh challenges or
that our current approach to the regulation of debt is optimal. We make
no claim that existing legal treatment of debt in bankruptcy, tax,
consumer protection, bank regulation, or other areas is ideal, rational,
or sufficient. In particular, the adequacy of current approaches to the
regulation of consumer debt has been subject to scrutiny. 235 Our more
basic point is that if ISAs can be subsumed under the rubric of debt,
then these questions can be addressed under the general umbrella of
lending regulation and reform. New categories need not be created.
Thus, for example, an ISA ultimately characterized as debt by a state
based on an analysis of factors would typically face that state's usury
law limitations on the interest rate and terms permitted. A debt
designation also more clearly suggests a role for the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau in the regulation of these new agreements.
B. Is it Too Much Like Human Ownership?
If the ISA is not debt, then it could either fall within the equitylike gray zone or, alternatively, could come too close to human
ownership. Thus, we should next examine the possibility that it creates
a problematic ownership or property-like interest in a human that
ought to be restricted, in order to eliminate that possibility. The
presence of four factors in particular would strongly suggest that a
contract too closely approximates human ownership:
Excessive duration of the contract. A contract that called
for payments over a longer period of time would suggest
human ownership more than one lasting, say, five years.
Too large a percentage of income encumbered. A contract
sharing a large percentage of income would look more
like ownership than one sharing a small percentage.

&

235. Questions regarding financial product regulation have arisen in the context of
articulating the mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. See generally Bar-Gill
Warren, supra note 15; Richard Cordray, Protecting Consumers in the Financial Marketplace:
Keynote Address, November 2, 2012, 2013 U. CI. LEGAL F. 1; Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A.
McCoy, Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial
Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 195 (2013).
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labor,

investment, and personal choices. The more control
exercised by the investor, whether formally or through
informal mechanisms and networks, the more an
agreement might look like servitude or ownership.
Too broad a base for income sharing. An agreement that
shares income from a specific business activity,
investment, or job intrudes less on a recipient's selfdetermination than one that shares a percentage of all
the individual's income.
For example, based on these factors, a contract that encumbers eighty
percent of the funding recipient's income over thirty years and in which
the funding provider has the power to direct the recipient's career
choices (such as a provision that the recipient must work in the
financial services industry for X years) would too closely approximate
servitude or slavery. Depending on the specific context, an ISA need not
have all four factors to trigger policy concerns and potential
invalidation. Ultimately, the analogy between an ISA and an
impermissible slavery/servitude arrangement will be a function of
weighing the four factors and determining how they infringe upon the
funding recipient. A finding that an ISA strongly resembles human
ownership might suggest that that we should put in place regulatory
structures that ban or circumscribe such ISA variants.
C. Regulating in the Equity-Like Gray Zone
If an ISA is not sufficiently analogous to traditional debt from
the perspective of a particular regulatory field to warrant the debt label,
but the ISA also does not rise to the level of human ownership or
indentured servitude to warrant serious government intervention, then
it must fall in the messy gray area of financial instruments that have
some equity-like features. As discussed in Part III.C, possible analogies
include corporate equity (either in the whole person or in a
circumscribed venture), partnership or joint venture (again either in
the person or in a venture), insurance, income assignments, gifts, or
subsidies. 236 The regulatory question is what legal rules should apply
to ISAs falling within this messy gray zone, with respect to protection
and treatment of both investors and funding seekers. The task is
236.

See discussion supra Part III.C; see also supra note 214.
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complicated by the fact that there may be significant differences among
ISAs, and these differences may demand different regulatory
approaches.
We suggest that the following factors might be considered in
determining where exactly in the gray zone a given ISA falls and, thus,
what rules should apply. As before, there is no expectation that each
regulatory field will use precisely the same set of factors to make this
determination. Additional factors may be relevant in a specific field.
However, given that these regulatory fields generally confront a
common array of financial arrangements, we anticipate that the
following factors would be relevant across most regulatory fields in
evaluating "gray zone" transactions. None of the proposed factors below
would be determinative, and the regulator's ultimate conclusion will
depend on the totality of the circumstances, determined by weighing
the relevant factors.
Interposition of a Corporate Entity. First, it is relevant
whether a corporate or other entity has been interposed
between the funding provider and the funding recipient.
This can help distinguish, analytically speaking, between
whether a corporate equity interest or a partnership/joint
venture interest has been created. The existence of an
intermediate entity (such as that interposed in the
Upstart transaction) is more likely to suggest corporate
equity.
Base for Sharing Income. As was the case in testing for
servitude or slavery, the income sharing base must
continue to be considered. If the income sharing base is
the funding recipient's total income (Line 22), the
arrangement may look more like a minority corporate- or
partnership-like equity stake in an individual herself,
rather than in a circumscribed venture undertaken by
that individual. If, alternatively, the income sharing base
is only income from a circumscribed set of activities (e.g.,
a discrete business), then the transaction may more
closely approximate an equity-like interest in a
circumscribed venture or a sale of that income stream.
While this factor does not help distinguish between
corporate and partnership/joint venture equity, it can
help differentiate between equity in a venture and equity
in a person and may also suggest a sale of an incomeproducing asset.
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Funding Provider's Expected Return on the Investment.
The degree to which the funding provider expects to earn
a return on her investment must also be considered.
Some ISAs are based on economic models that attempt to
ensure a certain rate of return. However, an agreement
could also be structured so that the funding provider does
not earn a profit (e.g., federal income-contingent student
loan repayment programs or nonprofits like Lumni and
13th Avenue). 237 Transactions structured so that the
funding provider does not make a profit may suggest an
element of gift, charitable donation, or subsidy rather
than equity ownership. Transactions in which the return
is essentially fixed may indicate a sale of an incomeproducing asset. The following are some factors that
might reveal the expected return on an investment: the
extent of the recipient's other borrowing, the amount
funded as compared to the repayment terms, the
estimated future earning potential of the recipient, and
the fund or startup's investment return history.
Funding Provider's Intent. It is also important to
consider the funding provider's intent as manifested by
objective factors. This can help distinguish equity-like
investments
from
arrangements
with
donative
motivations. For example, if the terms of the agreement
show that the funding provider's intention is to make a
substantial profit, this would detract from gift or subsidy
characterization, even if no profit is ultimately made. On
the other hand, if the formal and informal terms indicate
that mentoring between the funding investor and
recipient is the primary motivation, this may suggest
more strongly a gift or donation, despite an eventual
profit. For example, 13th Avenue Funding's nonprofit
model is reminiscent of informal arrangements in which
a community pools resources to send its promising youth
to school. Thus, it might seem inappropriate to
characterize 13th Avenue as equity and to regulate it in
a manner identical to a transaction like Upstart.

237. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing Lumni, 13th Avenue, and government
transactions).
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Identity of the Funding Provider. The identity of the
funding provider must also be considered. From a
commercial and regulatory perspective, there may be
important differences between government-based and
not-for-profit financing arrangements and those arising
in the private sector. Private-sector transactions are
generally expected to provide a market return to
investors and may look more like equity. 238 This may be
less so with nonprofit, low-profit, or government models,
where a significant gift, subsidy, or redistribution
element may dominate. It is more difficult to characterize
such agreements as equity, and it is correspondingly
unlikely that a unified regulatory scheme could
effectively govern all of the possible types of players in
this growing sector.
Funding Recipient's Application of the Funds. Another
factor is how the funding recipient applies the funds. To
the extent the funds are used for risk management rather
than to fund a business venture, pay education costs, or
otherwise generate income for the recipient, the
investment may be less like a partnership or corporate
equity-like interest and more like insurance and risk
diversification.
Whether Human Capital is Appreciating or Depreciating.
Whether the recipient's human capital is appreciating or
depreciating may influence the choice between insurance
and equity characterization. For example, in the
education context, the funding recipient's human capital
is presumably appreciating. In contrast, in the
professional football context, the player's human capital
is arguably depreciating or at risk. Contexts in which
human capital is depreciating may suggest an insurance
or earnings-smoothing arrangement more than an
equity-like arrangement, particularly if the funding
recipient is not using the funds to advance his incomeearning potential or business venture but to guard
against risk.

238. Thus, these new transactions do not necessarily make college cheap.
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Whether Risk is Being Pooled. The existence of risk
pooling would strongly suggest insurance. 239 Existing
ISAs have not generally created a pool for diversifying
against risk. One might argue that risk is effectively
being spread among the multiple funding providers, but
this structure is different from traditional insurance. An
indication that there is pooling of risk would buttress a
true insurance characterization.
Whether the return is dependent on a specified asset
expected to generate a certain return. Finally, we must
consider whether the return to the investor is generated
from a specified asset and whether that return is
relatively certain. If so, the arrangement may more
closely approximate a sale of an income-producing asset
rather than equity or something else.

The foregoing are some of the main factors that should be
considered by regulators in bankruptcy, tax, securities, and other fields
in determining where in the equity-like gray zone a given transaction
falls. As indicated, our list is not necessarily exhaustive, and other
factors may also be useful. Furthermore, the factors analysis we have
put forth is necessarily generic and essentially constitutes a generalized
prototype approach that may be modified and adjusted by each
regulatory field. Ultimately, these factors would need to be weighed
against each other to determine the true nature of the ISA based on the
totality of the circumstances.
Ultimately, the exercise of comparison and analogy through
multifactor analysis can serve as an evaluative heuristic in considering
the normative aspects of each particular ISA. It also can suggest the
likely best approach to that ISA's regulation.

V. APPLYING OUR MULTIFACTOR FRAMEWORK
This Article has argued that ISAs are sufficiently novel that they
merit scrutiny by regulators but are heterogeneous enough that a
unified regulatory approach is problematic. As such, this Article has
advocated regulation by analogy for ISAs using a multifactor analysis.
Although the precise set of factors examined by each regulatory field in
239. See supra Part HI.C; see also supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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performing this inquiry would likely be adjusted for the specific needs
of the field, we expect that certain core factors will be relevant across
most regulatory areas.
Part V illustrates the application of our proposed multifactor
analysis. Parts V.A and V.B apply our multifactor analysis to the Pave
ISA transaction, 240 concluding that while the analogy is not perfect,
Pave may look enough like a partnership that we should look to
partnership concepts in designing its legal and regulatory treatment
unless important policy considerations suggest otherwise. 24 1 Part V.C
examines the Rubio-Petri proposed legislation as an illustration of the
perils of a unified approach to ISAs.
A. Applying the Analysis to Pave
Applying the multifactor analysis to Pave, we first ask whether
Pave looks sufficiently like debt to fit into that familiar regulatory
category. As noted, each regulatory field would make that
determination itself. However, a core cluster of factors (which we
identified in Part IV and apply here) would likely be broadly relevant.
We then examine the other extreme-the possibility that Pave could
look enough like servitude or slavery to justify restriction. Concluding
that Pave is clearly distinct from debt and does not amount to servitude,
we examine where in the gray zone Pave falls.
1. Is Pave Analogous to Traditional Debt?
Testing the Pave transaction using the factors outlined in Part
IV.A, it would be hard to characterize Pave as debt. Of the seven factors,
four clearly suggest that the transaction is not debt, and two are neutral
or lean slightly away from debt characterization. Only one potentially
suggests debt characterization.
The parties' intentions and the label, given the transactions, the
form of the instrument, the lack of a fixed interest rate, and the
allocation of risk, suggest that the transaction is not debt:

240. As noted, it is unclear whether Pave's ISA has been replaced by a new loan product as of
August 2014. See discussion supra note 39. However, the Pave ISA still merits analysis as a
leading example of the new wave of ISAs. Moreover, Pave ISAs that were entered into prior to
August 2014 still exist and continue to raise tax and other regulatory questions.
241. Our discussion is based on information that has been made available on the Pave
website. See, e.g., Common Questions, PAVE, https://web.archive.org/web/20121216014602/http://
pave.com/questions, archived at http://perma.cc/79UX-T5S4. The actual Income Linked Payment
Agreement is not publicly available.
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Parties' intentions/transaction label. Pave's website
draws distinctions between Pave's structure and debt
with respect to repayment terms and the lender's ability
to share upside.242 Pave has also stated that its
"participation agreement is like a partnership, with
interests fully aligned for both parties."2 4 3
Form of the instrument. The absence of an unconditional
promise to pay signals that Pave is not debt.
Interest rate/interest payments. Pave's Income-Linked
Payment Agreement does not provide for a fixed interest
rate or for payment of interest. The funding recipient
pays a specified percentage of her total income annually,
as calculated on Line 22 of Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") Form 1040.244 This suggests that Pave's structure
is distinguishable from debt.
Risk allocation. Pave's investors bear the risk that
recipients will not succeed financially. Recipients may be
excused from payment entirely in years when their
income falls below 150 percent of the poverty line. 2 4 5
Thus, there is no guaranteed minimum return. On the
other hand, if the recipient is successful, the investor can
receive returns that exceed the rate of return on debt.246
These terms indicate equity.
Two of the remaining three factors either lean slightly away
from debt or are neutral:
Priority relative to other claimants/subordination. The
income sharing base is IRS Form 1040 Line 22 income,
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. What Counts as Income when Calculating How Much I Must Share with My Backers,
PAVE,
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407688--What-counts-as-income-whencalculating-how-much-I-must-share-with-my-Backers- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). If
recipient files a joint return, the spouse's income is deducted from the Line 22 income. Id.
245. This hardship exemption will not extend the agreement term. Is There Ever a Time
During the ParticipationPeriod When I Wouldn't Need to Share Income?, supra note 45.
246. The recipient can terminate the agreement early by repaying five times the amount
funded. Common Questions, supra note 241. This is higher than the three times the amount of
income cap in the Upstart transaction. See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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which includes business net income. Business net income
in turn takes into account business expenses (including
allowable business interest) reported on Schedule C.
Thus, the funding recipient will first pay business
interest and expenses before "sharing" income with the
investor. Such subordination of the repayment obligation
to the payment of business expenses allows the funding
recipient a large degree of discretion and may suggest
equity characterization. On the other hand, the
repayment obligation is not subordinated to payment of
personal interest, so subordination is at best partial.
Duration and fixed maturity date. The Pave agreement
term cannot exceed ten years. 24 7 This time frame is
compatible with either equity or debt characterization.
Furthermore, while the agreement has a fixed ten-year
term, there is no requirement that the investors actually
recover their investment within that time frame. Thus,
this factor is neutral at best.
Finally, "participation in management" is the only factor that
might signal debt rather than equity. Greater degrees of management
participation suggest an equity interest. Although mentoring is a
component of the Pave relationship, it does not appear to rise to the
level of true management control, at least on paper. 248 On the other
hand, it is possible that such mentoring may be robust in practice.
In sum, it would be difficult to characterize Pave as debt. 249 Not
only do a greater number of factors suggest "not debt" characterization;
the purpose of the transaction also indicates that it is likely not debt
because there is not really an expectation of repayment regardless of
whether the funding recipient succeeds. 250 Stated differently, the Pave

&

247. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
248. Common Questions, supra note 241:
Another major difference is that a Pave agreement has an added value-backers. Many
of them are eager to offer guidance, advice and connections in fields relevant to
prospects' interests. With all their experience, backers know that even one phone call
or email introduction can make a huge difference to someone who is just starting out in
an industry. Also, backer and prospect interests are aligned-the more successful
prospects are, the more their backers share in that success.
How It Works, supra note 170 ("Backers can choose to provide advice and support throughout the
talent's journey.").
249. We reached the same basic conclusion with respect to Upstart in prior work. See Oei
Ring, supra note 3, at 274-75.
250. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957)); see also Historic Boardwalk Hall,
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investors have a "meaningful stake in the success or failure of the
[venture]." 25 1 Thus, not only do the individual factors point away from
debt, but it is also clear that the core purpose of Pave is one of explicitly
sharing in the successes and failures of funding recipients, an
ownership or equity-like idea.
2. Does Pave Raise Human Ownership or Servitude Concerns?
Having determined that Pave cannot be conveniently slotted
into the regulatory category of debt, the next question is whether it
creates an unacceptable servitude or human ownership arrangement.
As discussed in Part IV.B, the presence of four factors would
strongly indicate that a contract closely approximates human
ownership: excessive duration of the contract, a high percentage of
income shared, a large degree of investor control, and a broad base for
sharing income. Although Pave uses a broad income sharing base (Line
22 of Form 1040), the contract is not unduly long (ten years), 252 nor is
the percentage of income shared unduly high (ten percent). 253 Further,
the investors do not exercise excessive control over funding recipients.
Thus, Pave does not rise to the level of human ownership or servitude
that ought to be banned.254
3. What Kind of Interest Has Been Conveyed by Pave?
Because Pave is not debt and does not cross the line into human
ownership, it follows that the transaction must fall in the zone of equitylike transactions. Therefore, we next ask what kind of equity-like
interest it most resembles. Closely examining its underlying economics
and applying the factors articulated in Part IV.C, we suggest that Pave
may be best analogized to a type of partnership between funding
providers and recipients in which the funding providers take a
partnership interest in the Talent's human capital.

LLC v. Comm'r, 694 F.3d 425, 450 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the court's analysis in CastleHarbour,
459 F.3d at 224); Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 232 (a "significant factor" in debt-equity
determinations is "whether the funds were advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment
regardless of the success of the venture.").
251. Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 224.
252. See supranote 42 and accompanying text. One could argue that the duration of the ISA
term should be compared against Talent's life or career expectancy in order to more accurately
measure excessive duration. On the other hand, a ten-year term is not notably longer (and in some
cases may be substantially shorter) than the repayment period for some traditional loan products.
253. Id.
254. See Oei & Ring, supranote 3, at 275 (reaching comparable conclusion regarding Upstart).
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Yet the analogy is not exact. If it were exact, there would not
have been any regulatory uncertainty. It is important in pursuing
regulation by analogy to appreciate that the "conclusion" the method
offers is not that an ISA is, for example, a partnership but rather that
the partnership category might be the closest existing regulatory
category. Critiques of regulation by analogy grounded in the argument
that an ISA such as a Pave is not a partnership under general
partnership principles, or tax or bankruptcy law, misconceive the
problem and the solution offered by this Article. Pave is distinct from a
traditional partnership because it creates a partnership interest in all
of a person's human capital over a set time period rather than in a
circumscribed but potentially indefinite venture. That said, the appeal
to Pave's investors is typically made on the basis of a proposal of a
circumscribed business venture or educational plan.
On balance, evaluation of the following factors suggests the
creation of a partnership-like arrangement:
Interposition of a corporate entity (distinguishing
partnership equity from corporate equity). Pave is a peerto-peer arrangement. 255 No intermediate entities have
been interposed. This is indicative of a partnership
rather than a corporate arrangement.
Base for sharing (distinguishing investment in a person
v. investment in a circumscribed activity, project, or
venture). Pave claims that "[t]he Pave agreement allows
backers to invest directly in an individual, not a project
or company." 2 5 6 The website notes that "the investment

is in whatever work the Talent chooses to pursue" and
that "[o]ne failed project doesn't mean a total loss for the
Backer, since the Talent will go on to do something
different." 257 Pave claims that "Backers are allies who
share in either the failures or achievements of their
Talent." 258 Such alignment of interests and intent to ally,
with the goal of maximizing profits or success, suggest a

255. See Tell Me More About Pave's Income-Linked Payment Agreement (IPA), supra note 43
(describing Pave as a "truly peer-to-peer agreement that is legally enforceable").
256. PAVE, supranote 152.
257. How Is Pave Different from Other Crowdfunding Platforms or FinancingAlternatives?,
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200398018-How-is-Pave-different-from-otherPAVE,
crowdfunding-platforms-or-financing-alternatives- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
258. Id.
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Funders' expected return (distinguishing equity from
donative arrangement). Pave explicitly highlights the
funders' expected return, which they calculate to provide
Backers "with an expected return . .. of 7%."261 Pave also
notes its proprietary funding model developed "by our
own expert Data Scientist in collaboration with Yale
University's nationally renowned Labor Economist,"
which incorporates a wide range of variables. 262
Investor intent (distinguishing equity from donative
arrangement). Pave seeks to market a compelling
investment opportunity to investors with a targeted rate
of return. 263 This is not a donative arrangement but is
more clearly equity.
Identity of the funding providers (distinguishing equity
from donative arrangement). Pave is organized by a
private, for-profit entity rather than a nonprofit or
government entity. The investors it seeks to attract are
"experienced, successful professionals" looking for a
"direct-investing platform." 2 6 4

These factors

suggest

equity rather than a donation or subsidy.
Use of the funds-growth v. protection (distinguishing
insurance-like structure from equity). Rather than
protect against economic shocks, funding recipients use
the funds for education or entrepreneurship. 26 5 Pave
emphasizes the "shared venture" nature of its

259. See supra Part III.C.2.
260. Will I Be Able to Exit the Pave IPA Early?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/enus/articles/200478356-Will-I-be-able-to-exit-the-Pave-IPA-early-(May
19, 2014) (on file with
authors).
261. What are the Expected FinancialReturns?, supra note 48.
262. PAVE, Our Model, http://www.pave.com/funding-model, archived at http://perma.cc/
M2M2-EM5K (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
263. Id; What are the Expected FinancialReturns?, supranote 48.
264. What Is Pave?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200597693-What-isPave- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
265. See supra Part II.A.3.
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arrangement. 2 6 6 This indicates that the structure is one
of investment, not insurance.
Whether human capital is increasing or decreasing
(distinauishing
insurance
from
equity).
Pave
characterizes itself as a "platform for networking
experienced, successful professionals with . . . rising,
talented individuals." 26 7 Human capital is most likely
appreciating, suggesting equity.
Whether risk is being pooled (distinguishing insurance
from equity). There is no indication of risk pooling in the
traditional insurance sense. 268 This suggests that the
arrangement is not insurance.
Whether return is dependent on a specified asset
expected to generate a certain return (distinguishing
sales of income streams from equity arrangements). The
return earned by the investors is a percentage of all the
annual income (Line 22, Form 1040) generated by the
recipient during the contract years. Neither the amount
nor the source is certain at the time of contract. Investors
are fully at risk with the funding recipient's financial
success. Thus, Pave is not a sale of a fixed income stream.
Thus, application of these core factors suggests that, on balance,
Pave resembles an equity-like arrangement rather than insurance, gift,
subsidy, or something else. As between corporate and partnership
equity, the better analogy is to a partnership-like arrangement because
Pave is peer-to-peer. With regard to the type of partnership, the Pave
structure more closely resembles an investment in the person and not
the project. Again, while we do not claim that the partnership analogy
is exact, 269 the likenesses suggest that Pave should be treated similarly
to partnerships for legal and regulatory purposes, unless there is a good
reason to deviate (as determined under each particular regulatory
regime).

266. See supra Part II.A.3.
267. What Is Pave?, supra note 264.
268. See supra Part II.A.3.
269. We could imagine, for example, that depending on certain facts, the transaction may look
more like the sale of an income stream, which would invite its own distinctive legal treatment.
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It might at first blush appear ludicrous to suggest that Pave is
most analogous to a partnership. However, despite arguably "light"
control of funding recipients, Pave is not unlike some services-partner
arrangements. For example, Pave is not so different from the case
where two people decide to partner in opening a vegetable-selling stand,
one providing capital and the other labor. One might argue that this
arrangement might bear stronger resemblance to an employeremployee relationship or some alternative economic arrangements;
however, at least some of these types of arrangements have been held
to be partnerships. Moreover, the Pave investors' interests may be
similar to those of some limited partners, who may not have much
direction over the enterprise. Additionally, the Pave relationship may
have some elements of joint control, which would more clearly indicate
a partnership or joint venture. 270 Pave promotes and identifies the
Talent's Backers as the "Team,"271 and Talent is required to submit a
funding proposal to obtain the funds. 2 72 Having determined that Pave
is clearly not debt using the primary factors likely determinative of debt
status, it is not that surprising that the closest analogy might be
partnership equity.
B. Legal and Regulatory Upshot of the MultifactorAnalysis
Assuming that regulators in various fields conclude that Pave
most resembles a partnership-like arrangement, what legal and
regulatory consequences might follow? While, as noted, the partnership
analogy may not be precise, and while the legal and regulatory
treatment of "regular" partnerships cannot be interposed without
modification on the new ISAs, some insights are possible. An in-depth
treatment of all possible legal and regulatory ramifications of the
partnership analogy is beyond the scope of this Article. The following
discussion very briefly surveys some key takeaways.
1. Taxation
The tax treatment of ISAs must be addressed because taxpayers
must make tax computation and return filing decisions annually,
regardless of actual tax liability. If an ISA is taxed as a partnership
rather than debt, key tax differences will result regarding timing,

270. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
271. See
What
We
Do,
PAVE
https://web.archive.org/web/20130328170616/http://
www.pave.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/9JJQ-5V8P (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
272. Id.
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location of income inclusion, recovery of investment (i.e., tax basis), and
deductibility of costs (e.g., interest).
It is not inconceivable that the IRS could treat Pave as a
partnership for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code has defined a
partnership to include a "syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on." 27 3 Treasury
regulations provide that "[a] joint venture or other contractual
arrangement may create a separate entity [i.e., a partnership] for
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business,
financial operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom." 2 74 In
addition, cases and IRS rulings contain precedent for recharacterizing
lending and other economic relationships as partnerships. 2 7 5 It is well
known that debt-equity analysis applies in the partnership tax context
to distinguish partnership equity from debtor-creditor relationships. 2 76
Even arrangements that have some features of debt (such as a very
certain return) have been treated as equity for tax purposes. 277
If Pave were taxed according to partnership principles, the
following key results might follow: First, the Pave "partnership" would
be required to keep book and tax capital accounts, track basis
adjustments at the partnership level, and file a partnership-level
information return. 278 Second, even though taxable income would be
computed at the partnership level, 279 each partner would have to
include for tax purposes her distributive share of partnership income in
her gross income, regardless of whether she has actually received any

273. I.R.C. §§761(a), 7701(a)(2) (2012).
274. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (2014); see also Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742
(1949) (holding that a partnership exists when two or more "parties in good faith and acting with
a business purpose intend[ I to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise").
275. Rev. Rul. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111; Hartman v. Comm'r,
17 T.C.M (CCH) 1020 (1958).
276. WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS,

§

3.05[3] (4th ed. 2015) ("[T]he confusing morass of debt-equity cases that exist in the corporate
context must be parsed in order to ascertain whether a particular relationship creates a
partnership or merely a debtor-creditor relationship."); I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; see
also TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2006)
(detailing factors to analyze "in determining whether an interest is "more akin to debt or equity").
277. McKEE § 3.05[3] (noting that "Congress and the Treasury have been willing to accept as
equity many instruments that have nearly all of the enumerated qualities of debt" and that "while
labeling may seem merely semantic, the words used have legal rights and obligations that attach
to them and may ensure the result they represent").
278. I.R.C. §§ 701, 703(a).
279. Given that Pave anticipates that Talent will file an individual Form 1040 providing the
basis for the income sharing, it is unclear how the tax system's requirement that a partnership
return be filed instead would impact the implementation of Pave's ISA.
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partnership distributions. 280 While the distributive share is typically
determined by the partnership agreement, where there is no
agreement, it will be determined in accordance with the partner's
interest in the partnership. 28 1 Third, partnership characterization
would require tracking of each partner's basis in the partnership
("outside basis"). Generally speaking, outside basis is increased by a
partner's distributive share of taxable income and decreased by any
distributions to the partner and her distributive share of partnership
losses. 282 Partnership treatment suggests that investors would not be
permitted full recovery of their entire basis before having an income
inclusion. 283
The treatment outlined above differs from that which would
result if Pave were, for example, treated as a debt or the sale of an
income stream. It also differs from the tax treatment described in the
Rubio-Petri Bill. 2 8 4 Key differences include (1) whether the funding
recipient would include all income earned on her individual Form 1040,
(2) whether she would receive an interest deduction on that Form 1040,
and (3) how investors would be taxed on income received from their
investment. 285

280. I.R.C. § 702(c).
281. I.R.C. § 704(a), (b). The distributive share will be computed in accordance with the
partner's interest in the partnership if the partnership's allocations lack substantial economic
effect. I.R.C. § 704(b). In computing partnership taxable income, certain deductions would be taken
into account at the partner level on their separate tax returns and certain items would have to be
separately stated. I.R.C. §§ 702(a)(1)-(7), 703(a). Also, a partner's capital account would be reduced
for any actual distribution made to the partner and increased by the partner's distributive share
of partnership income. I.R.C. § 705. See generally, WILLIAM LYONS & JAMES R. REPETTI,
PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXATION 44-60 (5th ed. 2011).
Treating Talent's income as belonging to the partnership is not prohibited by assignment
of income principles. See, e.g., Schneer v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 643, 663 (1991) (right to pool partnership
earnings overrode assignment of income principles). Courts have even held that salaries earned
by an individual partner can be attributable to the partnership if germane to the partnership's
business. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,

ESTATES, AND GIFTS § 75.2 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Bufalino v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M (CCH) 494 (1976)
(payments made to a partnership for services by one partner are includable in the income of the
partnership rather than the partner); Rev. Rul. 80-338, 1980-2 C.B. 30 (executor fees for partner's
services taxable to partnership, because partnership performed similar services)).
282. I.R.C. §§ 705, 722, 733.
283. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(a) (requiring a partner to include her distributive share of
partnership income regardless of whether such income is actually distributed to her).
284. H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. §§ 201, 301 (2014).
285. For example, if Pave were treated like debt, Backers might include interest and
determine income under something like the contingent bond method.
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2. Securities Law
The two central issues in securities law are whether an
instrument or arrangement is a security (and thereby subject to
antifraud provisions under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act), and if so,
whether offers to sell the security must be registered with the SEC
under the 1933 Act. 2 86

The 1933 Act defines the term "security" in part as "any note,
stock, treasury stock, . . . bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreements, . . . [or] investment contract."287 Given that stock is an
enumerated instrument in the securities law definition of a security,2 88

there is a strong presumption that stock is a security, and certainly
corporate stock would be so treated. 289 "Notes" are also an enumerated
instrument that constitutes a security, 290 with a corresponding
presumption. 291 However, securities case law has developed a test to
determine when a given note should in fact be treated as a security and
when it should not. Under the Supreme Court's "family resemblance"
test, notes are presumed to be securities unless they share family
resemblance (using a four-factor test) to a judicially crafted list of
transactions that are not considered securities. 292

286. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R.

2930-ENTREPRENEUR
ACCESS
TO
CAPITAL ACT
(Nov.
2,
2011),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/1 12/saphr2930r_20111102.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/X4KJ-URLB ("The President[] ... called for cutting away the red tape
that prevents many rapidly growing startup companies from raising needed capital, [and
supported a securities regulation exemption from registration] for 'crowdfunding.'").
287. Securities Act of 1933 §2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
288. Id.
289. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
290. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
291. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1990) (interpreting the language
of the Securities Acts as creating the rebuttable presumption that every note is a security).
292. Id. at 67; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(1). In its "family resemblance test," the Court, citing
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976) and
Chemical Bank v., Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) outlined four types of
notes that would not be securities: (1) "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured
by a mortgage on a home," (2) the "short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some
of its assets," (3) "the note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer," and (4) the "shortterm notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an
open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the
customer of a broker, it is collateralized)." The Court further identified four basic themes that
explained why certain notes should not be considered securities: (1) motivation (e.g., issuer seeking
general funds v. funding for a small asset); (2) plan of distribution for the instrument; (3)
reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (4) existence of other regulatory oversight that
reduces the need for securities regulation. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65-67.
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Finally, partnership interests, though not explicitly included on
the enumerated list of instruments treated as a security, 293 may be a
security if they constitute an "investment contract" under the statute. 294
This determination is made on the basis of the Supreme Court's Howey
test. 2 95 The Court in Howey provided that the term "investment
contract" under the Securities Act of 1933 covered a "contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person": (1) "invests his money," (2)
"in a common enterprise," and (3) "is led to expect a profit," and (4) the
expected profits are "solely 296 from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party."2 97 The fourth prong of the Howey test (regarding expecting
profits solely from the efforts of others) is likely to be of greatest
significance in analyzing the Pave transaction's treatment under
securities regulations. In assessing whether a joint venture or
partnership has created a security interest (i.e., whether it constitutes
an "investment contract"), courts carefully examine the role played by
different parties in generating the profits and whether that role has
been vested in a particular individual or group. 298
Thus, the determination of whether a given contract or
arrangement constitutes a security under the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act depends on the type of instrument that has been issued (e.g., note,
stock, partnership interest, or other). Assuming that an interest
constitutes a security, it will be subject to the antifraud provisions of
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. However, not all securities issuances are
subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. Although a
complete analysis of the securities registration rules is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is instructive to briefly consider one of the categories
of transactions exempt from 1933 Act registration: "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering."29 9

293. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
294. Id.
295. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (detailing the definition of
"investment contracts").
296. Subsequent courts have softened the Howey framing of the profit expectation to provide
that the prong is met if the profits are to be derived "primarily" or "substantially" from the efforts
of others. See, e.g., United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (applying a
substantiality standard) ; SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)
("[Tihe word 'solely' [in Howey] should not be read as a strict or literal limitation . . . , but rather
must be construed realistically, so as to include . .. schemes which involve in substance, if not in
form, securities.").
297. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
298. See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419-26 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing the
analysis for determining whether joint venture and partnership arrangements constitute
"investment contracts" under the 1933 Act).
299. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).

2015]

HUMAN EQUITY

749

Over the years, courts and the SEC have developed a set of
criteria used to determine whether there has been a "public offering."
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 3 0 0 focused on the
nature of the offerees in evaluating the nature of the offering.
Specifically, the Court concluded that to secure the exemption: (1) all
offerees needed access to the type of information that would otherwise
be included in a 1933 Act registration statement, and (2) the offerees
must be sufficiently sophisticated to seek and understand available
information. 30 1 The SEC has added an additional expectation that
"public advertising is inconsistent with a claim of private offering,"30 2
and courts have included other factors to be assessed. 303
In evaluating the Pave transaction under securities law, the
threshold inquiry would be whether Pave's arrangement constitutes a
security under the 1933 Act. Given our determination that Pave may
look most like a partnership, we would apply the investment
contract/Howey analysis described above. Recall that the fourth Howey
prong considers whether profits were expected to be derived by the
investor solely from the efforts of others. 304 Thus, the degree to which
Pave investors (Backers) exercise managerial control or authority over
the "enterprise" becomes critical in the securities law treatment of the
arrangement. The more control exercised over the funding recipient's
choices, the less likely that the ISA is a security that requires
registration.3 0 5 Although Pave emphasizes mentoring, real managerial
control by investors is arguably absent, which increases the likelihood
that Pave's arrangement would be subject to regulation as a security.
Relatedly, assuming the Pave transaction constitutes a security
subject to the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act (and correspondingly their

300. 346 U.S. 119 (1953); see also Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1959) (the nature, not number, of offerees determines whether there was a public offering).
301. Ralston, 346 U.S. at 126-27.
302. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33-4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 2781 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1962 WL 69540.
303. Among the factors considered by some courts include the number of offerees and the size
of the offering. E.g., Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Avien Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 899-900
(5th Cir. 1977) (considering number of purchasers)); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680, 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Barnett v. Triangle Mining Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
95.439 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1976).
304. See supranote 296 and accompanying text.
305. See Hurt, supra note 125, at n.95 (observing that a general partnership interest, in
contrast to a limited partnership interest, is presumptively not an investment contract). But
where the facts demonstrate that the general partners lack management knowledge and control,
even a general partnership interest can be a security. Id. (citing SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483
F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2007)). See also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1981)
(general partnership interest is a security if there is no meaningful control).
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fraud liability provisions), there remains the additional question of
whether the Pave transaction would be subject to registration
requirements. Again, a factual inquiry would demand scrutiny of the
nature of the offerees and the circumstances in which the offering was
made, using the analysis developed by Ralston Purina Co. and
subsequent cases.
Fundamentally, however, what is more significant for purposes
of the inquiry undertaken in this Article is not the ultimate treatment
of Pave by the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act but rather the mode of analysis
for determining their treatment. Depending on how the Pave
transaction was labeled, it would be subject to a different analysis
under the securities law. For example, stock would have a strong
presumption of status as a security; 306 a note would be analyzed using
the family resemblance test; 3 0 7 and a partnership would be evaluated
using the Howey test for investment contracts. 308 The preliminary step
of regulation by analogy assigns the ISA a "label," and that label
determines which analytical path will apply under the securities laws.
Beginning the entire process with attention to analogy helps ensure
that, for example, ISAs that look more similar to debt are subject to a
securities regulation regime comparable to that accorded to traditional
loans (such as student loans, consumer loans, or mortgages).
3. Other Consequences of Partnership Characterization
Tax and securities law are just two regulatory fields that are
impacted by a conclusion that Pave looks most like a partnership.
Partnership characterization would also hold consequences in other
areas of law. For example, an array of bankruptcy-related issues turn
on the question of whether Pave is considered a partnership or
something else (such as debt). 30 9 A finding of partnership may render
investors liable in tort for acts of the funding recipient. 310 It may also
306. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1985) ("[I]t would
improperly narrow Congress' broad definition of'security' to hold that the traditional stock at issue
here falls outside the Acts' coverage.").
307. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1990).
308. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
309. For example, if funding providers are creditors, they would have a claim against funding
recipients in the event of bankruptcy. In contrast, if Pave is a partnership, then each partner might
be considered liable for certain debts of the partnership owed to other creditors. Additionally, if
one of the "partners" files for bankruptcy, there may also be consequences for continuity of the
partnership.
310. Liability can attach both to the partnership and individual partners. The Uniform
Partnership Act provides: "A partnership is liable for loss or injury caused to a person, or for a
penalty incurred, as a result of a wrongful act or omission, or other actionable conduct, of a partner
acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership or with authority of the partnership."
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impact the application of state usury laws, as well as the jurisdiction of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
4. Observations on Regulation
A few caveats are in order. First, as noted, regulation by analogy
is likely to be most compelling where the closest analogue is also a
viable substitute. We believe that this will be the case in most
situations. For example, individuals looking for funding for a new
technology business could pursue funding via Pave, or could
alternatively seek investments from friends, family, or the public. If the
legal system draws regulatory distinctions between transactions that
function as close substitutes, this may distort the choice of transactional
form in a way that might be inefficient. 311 However, where the closest
analogue is not a viable substitute, or where some other funding
approach is so clearly prevalent as to make the closest analogue
irrelevant, then other considerations may suggest adoption of a
different regulatory treatment.
Second, we make no claim that the most analogous regulatory
regime will be perfect. Indeed, analogizing to partnerships may subject
the parties to the complicated rules applicable to partnerships. 312
Complications may also arise if regulatory fields disagree regarding the
characterization of an arrangement. Our point is that such challenges
are a feature of our current regulatory reality. For example, smaller
partnerships, such as the vegetable-stand operators in our earlier
example, are already subject to complicated partnership rules. Any
discussion of whether reforms are necessary or whether a safe harbor
should be enacted should take place as part of a broader conversation.
Third, as previously noted, we are open to the possibility of
creating a narrowly crafted safe harbor that provides regulatory

UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 305(a) (1997). Similarly, the UPA states: "Except as otherwise provided ..., all
partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise
agreed by the claimant or provided by law." Id. § 306(a).
311. Again, we do not argue that current regulatory regimes are efficient or optimal. We
merely contend that additional inefficiency-generating lines should not be drawn without due
consideration of their location.
312. For example, under United States tax law, a partnership is required to file an annual
information return reporting its income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits from partnership
operations. I.R.C. § 6031. However, the partnership itself does not pay income tax. Id. § 701.
Instead, items of partnership income, gains, losses, deductions, or credits are passed through to
the partners, who must take separate account of their respective distributive shares of such
partnership items on their respective tax returns. Id. §§ 702, 704. There are also detailed rules
governing partner and partnership basis computations, contributions to partnerships, partnership
distributions, transfers of partnership interests, and other matters. Id. §§ 705, 721-743.
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certainty in specific situations. 3 13 For example, tax law could mandate
a particular treatment for certain person-to-person ISAs of a short
duration that require repayment of a limited percentage of future
income and that are for certain specified purposes (e.g., education). 3 14
The existence of such a safe harbor would mean that certainty of tax (or
other regulatory) treatment could be achieved without resort to analogy
in those cases falling within the safe harbor. However, such safe
harbors ought to be narrowly crafted in order to minimize distortions
and inequities.
Finally, we do not claim that there will never come a time when
a new regulatory regime for various ISAs would be advisable. Our
contention is that because ISAs are new and may develop in uncertain
directions, a wait-and-see approach that analyzes and classifies them
by analogy to existing legal categories is preferable to creating a new
legal category at the outset. Even if and when such a new regime may
be warranted, however, it is unlikely that such new regime would be
uniformly appropriate for all ISAs. Any new regulatory category would
need to be narrowly tailored and carefully considered.
C. Critiquingthe "Investingin Student Success Act of 2014"
and thenSenator
Rubio
by
introduced
Legislation
Representative Petri in the 113th Congress sought to clarify the legal
treatment of ISAs. The proposed legislation was ultimately not enacted
but nonetheless is an example of the kind of approach against which
this Article cautions. 315 Instead of recognizing the heterogeneity of
ISAs, the proposed legislation accords a unified regulatory treatment to
a wide array of possible arrangements without differentiating between
them based on their underlying economics. The legislation also does not
consider how its proposed legal treatment would mesh with current
legal categories for regulating similar existing transactions, and what
inequities and distortions might be created by the interaction of these
regimes.
1. Legal Status
The proposed Rubio-Petri Bill authorized individuals to enter
into "income share agreements," defined to include agreements entered
into for "postsecondary education, workforce development, or other
313. See supra note 162.
314. Id. As noted, safe harbors are a design feature of many regulatory fields. See supra notes
18, 159 and accompanying text.
315. Investing in Student Success Act, H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. pmbl. (2014).
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purposes." 316 The bill covered agreements meeting the following
requirements: (1) the first $10,000 of income (as defined under the
contract) is exempt from the repayment obligation; (2) the maximum
contract duration does not exceed thirty years (not including extensions
for years in which the individual's income is below the $10,000
exemption amount); (3) the agreement specifies ways in which the
contractual obligation may be extinguished before the end of the
payment period; (4) the aggregate amount pledged under all ISAs
entered into by the individual does not exceed fifteen percent of the
individual's future income; and (5) the agreement contains certain
required disclosures. 3 17 The legislation also contained a noninterference
provision providing that "[a]n income share agreement shall not be
construed to give the contract holder any rights over an individual's
actions-it simply represents an obligation by the individual [to] pay
the specific percentage of future income."31 8
The first problem is that the class of transactions authorized is
potentially both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it
might encompass transactions with troubling servitude-like
characteristics as well as more benign arrangements. Specifically, a
transaction that authorizes fifteen percent income sharing over thirty
years (not including extensions) may last almost the entire duration of
a person's working life and may encumber a significant portion of
income during that time. The proposed legislation also allowed the
parties to define "income" under the contract, without any restrictions
on breadth. 3 19 Finally, despite the noninterference provision, the bill did
not account for situations in which funding providers exert soft controls
over the career and work choices of recipients. As discussed in Part
IV.B, these are factors that could render an ISA too close to a servitudelike arrangement to be normatively or legally permissible. 320 Yet, the
legislation did not adequately distinguish acceptable from unacceptable
transactions.
On the other hand, the legislation was too narrow because it is
unclear what it would do to a transaction like Fantex. The proposed
legislation might not have authorized Fantex because Fantex (1) does
not have a $10,000 exemption and (2) has a clawback clause should the
football player quit within two years. 32 1 Yet one could argue that of all

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. § 102(a).
Id. § 102(b)-(c).
Id. § 102(d).
Id. § 102(b)(2).
See supra Part IV.B.
See Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25.
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the ISAs, the Fantex athletes are most likely to hold negotiating power
and that Fantex looks more like insurance for the athlete than a
problematic equity- or ownership-like arrangement. To the extent that
the proposed legislation might not have covered Fantex (because it
failed to recognize its risk-management qualities), it might be
underinclusive.
The simultaneous over- and underinclusiveness of the proposed
bill highlights our concerns regarding overarching legislative solutions
at the present time. New regulatory regimes that are crafted hastily,
without assessing the individual economics of each transaction, may
inadvertently incentivize the wrong kinds of ISAs while suppressing
more benign variants. This may create distortions in the ISA sector,
particularly if done without considering how the industry might
subsequently develop. It is also not clear that simply crafting a
narrower bill will solve these problems because even a narrower bill
may be unintentionally over- or underinclusive and distortive.
2. "Not Debt" Characterization
A second problem is the bill's assertion that ISAs are not debt
and should not be treated like debt. The bill required covered ISAs to
include the following disclosure: "[T]he agreement is not a debt
instrument, and . . the amount the individual will be required to pay
under the agreement (A) may be more or less than the amount provided
to the individual; and (B) will vary in proportion to the individual's
future income." 32 2 The bill also provided that ISAs will not be subject to
state usury laws. 323

The bill's insistence that ISAs are not debt did not appreciate
that different ISAs may have different economics and that some present
and future variants may look enough like contingent debt that they
should be regulated as such. For example, some ISAs are subject to
modeling to achieve a specific rate of return (e.g., seven percent in the
case of Pave). 324 If the economics of the transaction as structured make
it extremely likely that the investor will earn a certain rate of return
despite the appearance of risk or contingency, it may well make sense

322. H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. § 102(c)(1) (2014).
323. Id. § 104.
324. See, e.g., Richie Bernardo, Usury Laws by State, Interest Rate Caps, the Bible & More,
CARDHUB, http://www.cardhub.comledu/usury-laws/#state,
archived at http://perma.cc/7KTMPQS2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (listing usury rates by state, including North Dakota's 5.55
percent limit, Michigan's 7 percent limit, Iowa's 4.75 percent limit, and Pennsylvania's 6 percent
limit).
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for state usury laws to apply, especially since the rate of return on some
ISAs may exceed the maximum interest rate under state usury laws. 32 5
Failure to consider the ways in which ISAs may resemble debt
may enable traditional lenders to use loan-like versions of ISAs to
circumvent state usury laws and other debt rules. This is symptomatic
of a more general concern: designing new regulatory regimes without
examining ISAs on a case-by-case basis or considering how a new
regime may interact with existing ones to create costs and distortions
is a risky approach. Given the newness of ISAs, regulation should be
undertaken on a more nuanced basis.
3. Taxation
The proposed bill's tax treatment of ISAs was somewhat
inconsistent with its assertion that ISAs are not debt. Under the bill,
the amount initially received by the funding recipient is not includible
in the recipient's gross income.3 26 This is consistent with the tax
treatment of traditional borrowing. 327 However, the bill did not address
the situation in which the funding recipient ultimately repays the
funding provider less than the funds received. In the case of debt, there
would likely be cancellation of indebtedness income to the funding
recipient. 328 The bill also provided that ISAs are not eligible for the
student loan interest deduction.329
With respect to the funding provider, the bill allowed full basis
recovery before an income inclusion. 330 Thus, if a funding provider
invests $10,000, and receives $2,000 a year for ten years under an ISA,
she does not have a gross income inclusion until the sixth year. Such
upfront basis recovery is inconsistent with the tax treatment of
traditional lenders, who may recover basis in a manner more consistent
with accrual accounting. Oddly,- though, the bill labeled the funding
provider's income from the ISA as "interest," despite the fact that the

325. See State Usury Laws-Maximum Legal Interest Rates, LENDINGKARMA, http://
www.lendingkarma.com/content/state-usury-laws-legal-interest-rates/,
archived at
http://
perma.cc/7S7J-HUJQ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (detailing each state's maximum interest rates).
326. H.R. 4436 § 201(a).
327. See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) ("Because of the obligation [to repay the
loan at a future date], the loan proceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer.").
328. See I.R.C. § 108 (2012) (defining limited exceptions to the rule that discharge of debt is
income in circumstances involving bankruptcy, insolvency, real property, and farms). Thus, if a
funding recipient ultimately repays only $8,000 over the life of the ISA, should she have to include
$2,000 in gross income and, if so, when?
329. H.R. 4436 § 301(a); see also I.R.C. § 221(a) (outlining the student loan interest deduction).
330. H.R. 4436 § 201(b)(1).
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agreement is expressly required to state that the ISA is not debt in
order to be covered by the bill. 331

This proposed tax treatment is problematic because it creates
jagged intersections with the tax treatment of similar financial
instruments (most obviously debt, but others as well) without thinking
them through. The treatment accorded ISAs is sometimes more
favorable than that given other transactions (e.g., upfront basis
recovery) but sometimes less so (e.g., denial of student loan interest
deduction). These differences may create tax-induced distortions in the
choice between two economically similar instruments, not to mention
potential tax inequities. Again, we are not saying that lines should
never be drawn and special regimes never created. Our point is that
such lines should be created with caution. 332
4. Bankruptcy Discharge
The proposed legislation made ISAs nondischargeable in
bankruptcy, although it was confusing on this point. Specifically, the
bill would have amended I.R.C. § 221(d)'s definition of "qualified
education loans" to include "income share agreements." Therefore, by
cross-reference, it made covered ISAs nondischargeable, because
"qualified education loans" are excepted from bankruptcy discharge. 333
The bill also required a disclosure that "the obligations of the individual
under the agreement are not dischargeable under bankruptcy law." 3 34
Such nondischargeability tracks existing bankruptcy treatment of
education debts but differs from the treatment of many other debts.
Confusion arises because the bill defined "income share
agreements" to include agreements "for postsecondary education,
workforce development, or other purposes."335 Thus, the bill made all
ISAs nondischargeable, not just those entered into for education
funding purposes. This treatment is overinclusive with respect to some
ISAs and may distort the choice between ISAs and traditional debt.336
Here, again, appreciating the heterogeneity of possible ISA
arrangements can help reduce regulatory discontinuities.
331. See id. §§ 102(c)(1), 201(b)(2).
332. See, e.g., Weisbach, supranote 16, at 1627-28 (cautioning that distinctions in tax law "be
based on the efficiency of competing rules rather than on doctrinal concerns or traditional tax
policy").
333. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).
334. H.R. 4436 § 102(c)(2).
335. Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
336. But to the extent recipients seek ISA funding to pay off nondischargeable student loans
before seeking a bankruptcy discharge, it might be appropriate to make those ISAs
nondischargeable as an antiabuse measure.
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5. Investment Company Act Treatment
The proposed legislation would also have amended the
Investment Company Act of 1940.337 The Investment Company Act
(" '40 Act") seeks to protect investors who trust others with the
management and investment of their savings through a vehicle that
typically uses the invested funds to hold cash, securities, andlor futures
and commodities. Mutual funds, for example, are classic investment
companies. From an investor perspective, the arrangement offers
investment expertise and diversification. But the arrangement also
poses the risk of abuse by the managers, particularly given the liquid
nature of the assets held (as compared to an operating business).3 38
Thus, the Investment Company Act requires covered companies to
register (unregistered investment companies are barred from interstate
commerce under Section 7 of the Investment Company Act) and
imposes various restrictions on their operation in order to curb the risk
of abuse. Among the various restrictions and oversight provisions,
Section 15 of the Investment Company Act regulates the relationship
between an investment company and its underwriters and investment
advisors. Absent such regulation, this relationship could be prone to
abuse where the "advisor" is also the organizer of the investment
company.
The Rubio-Petri Bill sought to exclude from the definition of
"investment company" persons in the business of arranging ISAs. 339 If

such persons are excluded, the investor protections of the Investment
Company Act would not apply to investors in ISAs. The bill would have
achieved this by expanding the current exemption in the Investment
Company Act from the definition of "investment company." The
exemption currently applies to persons engaged in banking, lending,
and related activities (Section 3(c) of the '40 Act), and the bill would
have expanded it to include ISAs. The bill would also have expanded
the current exemption for persons who do not issue certain securities or
certificates and are engaged in specified lending type activities by
including ISAs in those specified activities. 340 Thus, the proposed bill
effectively exempted businesses offering ISAs from regulation under
the '40 Act.

.

337. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c).
338. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 6 (1940) ("[I]ndividuals who lack integrity will continue
to be attracted by the opportunities for personal profit available in the control of the liquid assets
of investment companies. .
339. H.R. 4436 § 501(1).
340. Id. § 501(2).
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Like other aspects of the bill, the investment company provisions
failed to appreciate the variety of possible ISA structures and how their
legal treatment may interact with that of similar financial
arrangements. While some ISAs are peer-to-peer, others might, in fact,
operate similarly to investment companies, as envisioned by the '40 Act,
and serve as a centralized repository of cash for passive investment and
diversification by managers. For example, Lumni enables investors to
invest in "funds" managed by Lumni, where the fund enters into income
sharing arrangements with students. 341 Lumni offers investors a choice
of different funds, including for-profit and nonprofit variants. 342 It is not
obvious why such funds should be per se exempt from the "investment
company" definition, and the investors excluded from Investment
Company Act protections, just because the funds hold and offer ISAs. 3 4 3
This regulatory decision creates inequities based on fund portfolios and
is likely to generate gaps, distortions, and costs. It might encourage the
development of a market for investment funds holding ISAs that
replicate the business of investment companies but escape '40 Act
requirements. In contrast, an approach based on regulation by analogy
would ask whether a given ISA closely mirrors structures traditionally
covered by the '40 Act and would recommend consistent treatment
absent a compelling reason for departure.
6. Summary Observations
Failure to consider the particular economics of different ISAs
and to examine how their regulatory treatment would interact with
that of similar financial arrangements creates inequities and
behavioral distortions at the regulatory intersections. Again, we do not
argue that new regulatory categories should never be created. We
simply point out that imposition of a new regulatory regime without
fully understanding the content and development of the regulated
industry is likely to draw lines in an inefficient and inequitable manner.

341. See About Lumni, supranote 7 (describing "Lumni'sfund management model").
342. Id.
343. Such funds might qualify for another exemption, such as a (3)(c)(1) or (3)(c)(7) exemption.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2012). The point is that the requirements for such exemptions would
have to be met independently. There would not be a blanket carve out. Furthermore, even if we
decided that Lumni's education focus justified its exclusion from the Act, the actual scope of the
Rubio-Petri proposal is much broader.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The new ISAs raise a number of important public policy and
regulatory issues that the legal system is only now beginning to
contemplate. Given the growth and proliferation of ISAs, however,
these regulatory issues cannot be ignored. This Article has proposed an
analytical approach to evaluating ISAs and designing their regulation.
It has argued that case-by-case regulation by analogy-that is,
comparing and analogizing each new transaction to existing financial
arrangements and regulating it akin to its closest analogue-is most
likely to yield efficient rules that are not over- or underinclusive.
Regulation by analogy can help avoid the drawing of unfair and
distortionary lines between economically similar transactions. By
contrast, a hastily implemented, unified regulatory scheme that
governs all ISAs runs the risk of being poorly tailored because the new
agreements are not homogeneous. This Article has suggested a
multifactor analysis that probes each transaction's true economics,
regardless of its formal labels, in performing such regulation by
analogy.
One might argue that regulation by analogy creates certain
risks, including the risk of chilling the ISA market due to lack of
regulatory certainty. The desire for regulatory certainty or
predictability is a reasonable goal. However, as we have argued,
regulatory certainty should not be conflated with substantive
uniformity. It is possible to achieve a degree of regulatory certainty
while nevertheless choosing to regulate by analogy. This could be
accomplished, for example, through the use of advance rulings or
prototype guidance, or through the judicious use of safe harbors.
Moreover, substantive uniformity does not necessarily guarantee
regulatory certainty in application.
We do not suggest that a unified framework will never be
possible or desirable. There may well come a time when, given more
information about these new transactions, it will be possible to craft a
more unified regulatory approach for at least some ISAs. We argue,
however, that now is not that time. The market for ISAs is relatively
new and still developing. Future variants are likely to emerge. Given
the lack of information and experience regarding these agreements,
regulation by analogy is the better approach.
Finally, we in no way imply that current regulatory regimes are
necessarily perfect or even adequate. Nor do we imply that familiar
preexisting categories, such as debt, do not raise important public policy
issues. In fact, there may be serious problems with our current
regulatory approaches, and income share agreements may serve to
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illuminate the public policy concerns raised by long-accepted
arrangements, such as debt. Our point is merely that, to the extent that
there are deficiencies in current regulatory schemes, this is a problem
that should be taken up separately. In this sense, our regulation by
analogy proposal may be characterized as a "second-best proposal" for
an imperfect world.

